The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and
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Lori E. Shaw∗
On September 11, 2001, thousands of lives were lost, buildings
were demolished, and our nation’s democratic institutions were
shaken to their core. One such institution, the federal grand jury,
continues to feel the reverberations from that day. The doctrine of
grand jury secrecy, enshrined under the common law and
subsequently codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)
(“Rule 6(e)”), faces perhaps the most serious threat in its history.
In response to the continuing danger posed by terrorism,
Congress has amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) to
create unprecedented exceptions to the rule that matters before a
1
federal grand jury must not be disclosed. As part of a much larger
plan to encourage the sharing of information by law enforcement
2
and intelligence officials, a new exception to Rule 6(e) created by
3
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”) facilitates the sharing
of grand jury materials relating to intelligence matters with federal
4
intelligence, immigration, defense, protective, and security officials.
To further address the threat, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
5
Prevention Act of 2004 added a second exception to Rule 6(e):
∗
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See infra Part I.C.
2
See infra notes 114–35 and accompanying text.
3
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections
of 18, 22, 28 and 50 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
4
Patriot Act § 203(a), 115 Stat. at 278–80 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(3)); see infra notes 94–188 and accompanying text.
5
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
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Grand jury materials relating to threats to national security (such as
terrorism and sabotage) may be disclosed to a wide-ranging group of
6
officials, including foreign officials. Neither of the new exceptions,
however, requires judicial approval of disclosures or a showing of
7
particularized need. Constitutional challenges are almost certain.
Notably, unlike many other provisions of the Patriot Act and
some other provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
8
Prevention Act, these provisions do not contain a sunset rule. In
other words, these are not wartime security measures; rather, the
changes are permanent. Accordingly, Congress is obligated to revisit
these hastily crafted policy decisions made against the backdrop of a
national security crisis.
Part I of this Article describes the history of grand jury secrecy
within the United States from its common-law beginnings to the most
recent amendments to Rule 6(e). Examining the relationship
between the right of grand jury secrecy and the Grand Jury Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, Part II concludes that the right of grand jury
secrecy enjoys constitutional protection. Part III then determines
that the newly created exceptions to Rule 6(e) are, at best, poor
public policy and, at worst, violations of the Grand Jury Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to Rule
6(e) that would preserve a right valued for nearly a millennium and
bring the new exceptions within constitutional limits without
sacrificing national security interests.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF GRAND JURY SECRECY IN THE UNITED STATES
The history of grand jury secrecy within the United States can be

458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
6
Id. § 6501(a), 18 Stat. at 3760 (codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)); see infra notes
188–198 and accompanying text.
7
See Frederick P. Hitz, Unleashing the Rogue Elephant: September 11 and Letting the
CIA Be the CIA, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 765, 773 (2002).
8
The Patriot Act contains a sunset provision that makes the Act ineffective as of
December 31, 2005. Patriot Act § 224(a), 115 Stat. at 295 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2510 note (Supp. I 2001)). However, the sunset provision specifically exempts
section 203(a), which amended Rule 6(e). Id. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 contains sunset rules for a few provisions, though
not the provisions which amend Rule 6(e). See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act § 6603(g), 118 Stat. at 3764 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §
2332b). The proposed PATRIOT Oversight Restoration Act, S. 1695, 108th Cong.
(2003), would extend the Patriot Act’s sunset provision to include section 203(a); see
also 149 CONG. REC. S12284 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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divided into three distinct eras: the common-law era, the preSeptember 11th rules era, and the post-September 11th rules era.
A. The Common-Law Era
9

“[O]lder than our Nation itself,” the right to indictment by a
10
grand jury journeyed to the New World with the English colonists.
In the United States, as in England, “the grand jury has convened as a
11
body of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret . . . .” For
12
centuries, the common law protected grand jury secrecy.
To understand the reasons for secrecy, one must understand the
role of the grand jury proceeding. Grand jury proceedings have
traditionally served two functions: investigating whether there is
probable cause that a crime has occurred (i.e., the “sword” or
13
“investigatory” function) and screening cases to shield innocent
persons from unwarranted prosecution (i.e., the “shield” or
14
Thus, grand juries serve both the
“screening” function).
governmental interest in finding and punishing wrongdoers and the
individual interest in avoiding the indiscriminate exercise of
15
governmental authority. Although the grand jury was created to
16
serve the investigatory function, by the seventeenth century, the
17
screening function had risen to prominence. Indeed, the screening
9

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959).
See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); Mark Kadish, Behind the
Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 5–16 (1996). The first regular American grand jury sat in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635. RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE
GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1631–1941, at 6 (1963).
11
Costello, 350 U.S. at 362. In the early English criminal courts, “if a grand juror
disclosed to a person accused the evidence before the grand jury in his case, such
grand juror became accessory to the crime, if it was a felony, and a principal, if it was
treason . . . .” In re Atwell, 140 F. 368, 370 (W.D.N.C. 1905), rev’d, Atwell v. United
States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908). In American courts, disclosure was punished with
contempt proceedings. Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir.
1939).
12
See, e.g., Goodman, 108 F.2d at 520 (holding that despite lack of statute or rule
requiring grand jurors or grand jury witnesses to take oath of secrecy, such was
within discretionary power of courts). American courts often required grand jurors
and witnesses to take an oath of secrecy. Id. at 518–19.
13
SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE §
3.1 (1996).
14
Id. § 2.2.
15
Id.
16
YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 1.
17
“[U]nlike its English progenitor, the American grand jury originally began, not
10
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function was viewed by the nation’s founders as being of such
18
consequence that it was incorporated into the Fifth Amendment of
19
the United States Constitution.
Given the functions the grand jury served, the necessity of
20
conducting its proceedings in private was obvious. Long before the
discovery of the New World, grand jurors were required to take an
21
oath of secrecy. Prior to the War of Independence, governmental
22
representatives were barred from jury deliberations. In 1681, John
Somers, a noted scholar read on both sides of the Atlantic, outlined
23
If
three reasons why secret proceedings serve the public good.
targets were aware of the grand jury proceedings, they might conspire
24
25
to “hide their crimes,” or they might flee. Either of these events
would impede the investigatory function. Also, questioning witnesses
26
privately and separately helps uncover the truth, a goal vital to both
27
28
the innocent target (i.e., the screening function) and the King
as an arm of the executive, but as a defense against monarchy. It established a screen
between accusations and convictions and initiated prosecutions of corrupt agents of
the government.” Kadish, supra note 10, at 10.
18
See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (“Historically, this body has
been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing
between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority
group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was
dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.”).
19
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see infra Part II. By the end of the Revolutionary War,
“indictment by a grand jury had assumed the position of a cherished right.”
YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 41.
20
For a more detailed explanation of the interests protected by grand jury
secrecy see infra Part II.C.
21
Kadish, supra note 10, at 13.
22
Id.
23
JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISH-MEN’S LIVES, OR THE TRUST, POWER,
AND DUTY OF THE GRAND JURYS OF ENGLAND 44–55 (photo. reprint 1979) (1681).
24
Id. at 44.
25
Id. at 46.
26
See id. at 46–47 (“Yet the reason will be still more manifest for keeping secret
the accusations and the Evidence by the Grand Inquest if it be well considered, how
useful and necessary it is for discovering truth in the Examinations of Witnesses in
many, if not most cases that may come before them; when if by this Privacy Witnesses
may be examined in such manner and Order, as prudence and occasion direct; and
no one of them be suffered to know who hath been examined before him, nor what
questions have been asked him, nor what answers he hath given, it may probably be
found out whether a Witness hath been biassed [sic] in his Testimony by Malice or
Revenge, or the fear or favour of men in Power, or the love or hopes of Lucre and
gain in present or future, or Promises of impunity for some enormous Crime.”).
27
Id. at 49–52.
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(i.e., the investigatory function).
Under the common law, the right of grand jury secrecy was
qualified: It could be overcome upon a showing that disclosure was
“essential to the enforcement of the constitutional guaranties or to
the protection, preservation, or enforcement of public or private
29
rights.” The standard applied was stringent. Absent a showing of
substantial need, matters occurring before a grand jury were almost
30
never subject to disclosure.
A majority of the reported cases
involved requests for disclosure by defendants seeking to contest an
31
indictment, but disclosure was also sought by government attorneys
32
desiring to use grand jury materials at trial and in other
28

Id. at 53–55.
McKinney v. United States, 199 F. 25, 38 (8th Cir. 1912) (Sanborn, J.,
dissenting).
30
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940)
(“[A]fter the grand jury’s functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the
ends of justice require it.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Terry 39 F. 355,
356 (N.D. Cal. 1889) (stating that “general rules or doctrines must in some cases give
way; but exceptions to their application must be admitted with extreme caution, and
on the clearest ground of their necessity, to secure substantial, and not merely
technical, rights”); United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 1881) (“The
rule which may be adduced from the authorities, and which seems most consistent
with the policy of the law, is that whenever it becomes essential to ascertain what has
transpired before a grand jury it may be shown, no matter by whom; and the only
limitation is that it may not be shown how the individual jurors voted or what they
said during their investigations, because this cannot serve any of the purposes of
justice.”) (citations omitted). Departing from the rule of secrecy, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Atwell held that once the grand jury has
issued an indictment and been discharged and the defendant has been taken into
custody, grand jurors are no longer bound by an oath of secrecy. Atwell v. United
States, 162 F. 97, 102–03 (4th Cir. 1908). The idea that the need for secrecy
diminishes after the grand jury has completed its work gained some acceptance. See,
e.g., Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1933). In the years following
the Metzler decision, however, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that no requirement of
secrecy remains “seems to have made but slight impression upon the federal courts
in disposing of many kindred questions.” United States v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 26 F.
Supp. 429, 430 (D.D.C. 1939).
31
See, e.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1941)
(upholding trial court’s denial of defendants’ plea to review sufficiency of evidence
before grand jury); United States v. Cent. Supply Ass’n, 34 F. Supp. 241, 242–46
(N.D. Ohio 1940) (overruling defendants’ motion to release grand jury witnesses
from their oath of secrecy to allow defendants to prepare for trial); Am. Med. Ass’n,
26 F. Supp. at 429–31 (granting government’s motion to strike defendant’s motion
to elicit information from grand jurors relating to possible prosecutorial
misconduct); United States v. Perlman, 247 F. 158, 161–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (denying
defendant’s motion to quash indictment and concluding insufficient reason existed
to warrant inspection of grand jury minutes by court or defendant).
32
See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 233 (concluding that “use of grand
29
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33

proceedings.
Disclosure was permitted in only a handful of
34
reported decisions.
Persons seeking disclosure bore the burden of showing a
particularized need for disclosure, such that vague generalities did
35
not suffice. For example, grand jury secrecy was “not to be set aside
on every request or suggestion of the person indicted, but only when
36
there [was a] probability of serious illegality.” Further, the court
had the duty to determine if and when some other need outweighed
37
the need for secrecy. Not taken lightly, breaching secrecy could

jury testimony for the purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness rests in the
sound discretion of the trial judge”).
33
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 283–85 (E.D. Pa. 1933)
(permitting grand jury testimony in beer permit revocation proceeding); United
States v. Cobban, 127 F. 713, 721–22 (D. Mont. 1904) (permitting examination of
grand jurors to determine if prosecutorial misconduct tainted grand jury
proceeding).
34
See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 231–34 (permitting court-authorized
disclosure because “necessary or appropriate” for refreshing recollection of witness at
trial); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. at 283–85; Farrington, 5 F. at 343–48
(recognizing right of court to remove veil of secrecy to investigate prosecutorial
misconduct before grand jury).
35
See, e.g., Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113 (finding evidence that grand jury was not
presented direct testimony on particular element was insufficient to justify reviewing
record of proceedings because element may have been established using
circumstantial evidence); Am. Med. Assn., 26 F. Supp. at 429–31 (refusing to review
grand jury record based on affidavit of defense counsel that “he has been ‘informed’
by various defendants and ‘believes’ that attorneys for the government presented
irrelevant testimony to the grand jury, advised it as to the law, and requested and
persuaded it to return the indictment”).
36
Shushan, 117 F.2d at 113; accord Perlman, 247 F. at 161 (noting judge’s right to
inspect grand jury minutes “should be sparingly exercised, unless a strong case is
made out requiring examination of the minutes in the furtherance of justice, or for
the protection of individual rights”).
37
See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940) (“Logically,
the responsibility for relaxing the rule of secrecy and of supervising any subsequent
inquiry should reside in the court, of which the grand jury is a part and under the
general instructions of which it conducted its judicial inquiry.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1939)
(holding that “the court may at any time in the furtherance of justice remove the seal
of privacy from grand jury proceedings”); United States v. Cent. Supply Ass’n, 34 F.
Supp. 241, 243 (N.D. Ohio 1940) (“We also know that from earliest times the veil of
secrecy was cast over the deliberations of the grand jury and they were not called
upon to disclose what occurred during their deliberations except in a judicial inquiry
directed by the court.”); Am. Med. Ass’n., 26 F. Supp. at 430 (finding that only court
could release grand jurors from their oath of secrecy). But see Atwell v. United States,
162 F. 97, 101 (4th Cir. 1908) (ruling that grand jurors were not bound to oath of
secrecy “after presentment and indictment found, made public, and custody of the
accused had, and the grand jury finally discharged”).
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38

result in prosecution for criminal contempt. These basic policies
continued with the adoption of Rule 6(e), which is discussed in the
following sections.
B.

Rule 6(e) Prior to September 11th

Prior to the events of September 11th, both the text of Rule 6(e)
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule reflected “the
orthodox view that all proceedings before the Grand Jury should
39
remain secret unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”
1.

The Text of Rule 6(e)

Adoption of Rule 6(e) in 1944 codified the common-law
doctrine of grand jury secrecy. Rule 6(e) stated:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than
its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the
attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when
so directed by the court preliminary to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request
of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a
motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
40
before the grand jury.

Despite the absence of an express provision permitting contempt as a
remedy for unauthorized disclosure, the courts continued to view
contempt as the proper sanction for persons who removed the veil of
41
secrecy.
38

Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1556–57 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing In re
Summerhayes, 70 F. 769, 773–74 (N.D. Cal. 1895)).
39
United States v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D. Del. 1950).
40
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1976) (amended 1977).
41
See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 43 (6th Cir. 1965) (identifying
contempt as proper sanction for unauthorized disclosure); United States v. Schiavo,
375 F. Supp. 475, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (noting that proper sanction for unauthorized
disclosure is a contempt proceeding); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283,
293 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (concluding that court has inherent power to “discipline the
attorneys, the attendants or the grand jurors themselves for breach of the secrecy
surrounding the body”). This practice was consistent with the rulemakers’ intent as
expressed in the notes accompanying the early drafts of the rule. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6
advisory committee’s note (Second Preliminary Draft 1944) (“Violation of the rule
renders such persons liable to contempt proceedings.”), reprinted in 4 DRAFTING
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (Madeleine J. Wilken &
Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFTING HISTORY].

502

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:495

According to the Advisory Committee, the new rule
“continue[d] the traditional practice of secrecy on the part of
members of the grand jury, except when the court permits a
42
disclosure.” Rulemakers never questioned the continuance of this
practice. From the preliminary draft, grand jury secrecy was part and
43
parcel of the criminal rules. In the notes accompanying the early
44
drafts of the rule, the Committee specifically pointed to the
justifications for secrecy set forth in United States v. Providence Tribune
45
Co., which warned:
Secrecy is essential to the proceedings of a grand jury for many
reasons. Publicity may defeat justice by warning offenders to
escape, to destroy evidence, or to tamper with witnesses . . . .
Secrecy is also required in order that the reputations of innocent
persons may not suffer from the fact that their conduct is under
investigation, or has been investigated, by a grand jury . . . .
Secrecy is further required for the protection of witnesses who
may go before the grand jury, and to encourage them to make
full disclosure of their knowledge of subjects and persons under
46
investigation, without fear of evil consequences to themselves.

The phrase “matters occurring before the grand jury” has been
47
interpreted to protect a wide variety of materials.
[It] includes not only what has occurred and what is occurring,
but also what is likely to occur. Encompassed within the rule of
secrecy are “the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of
testimony” as well as actual transcripts, “the strategy or direction
of the investigation, the deliberations or questions of jurors, and
48
the like.”

Among other things, grand jury records and transcripts are
49
50
protected, as are witness testimony and reports that summarize or
42

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note; accord United States v. Sells
Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983).
43
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) (Advisory Committee’s unpublished preliminary draft
1942), reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 41, at 50.
44
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (Second Preliminary Draft
1944), reprinted in 4 DRAFTING HISTORY supra note 41, at 16–22.
45
241 F. 524 (D.R.I. 1917).
46
Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
47
See generally BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 13, § 8.4.
48
In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting
SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); Fund for
Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 869 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
49
BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 13, § 8.4.1.
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51

analyze materials presented to the grand jury. The goal is to prevent
the disclosure of “anything which may reveal what occurred before
52
the grand jury.”
Under the original Rule 6(e), the sole exception to the
requirement of judicial approval involved disclosure to “attorneys for
53
the government for use in the performance of their duties.” Given
that it was intended to allow disclosure to persons who were already
entitled to be present in the grand jury room, this exception (the
“government-attorney exception”) was entirely consistent with the
54
doctrine of grand jury secrecy.
In 1977, Rule 6(e) was amended to allow disclosure without
judicial approval to “such government personnel . . . as are deemed
necessary by an attorney for the government to assist an attorney for
the government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to
55
enforce Federal criminal law.” Rulemakers justified the disclosure
based on government attorneys’ inability to adequately conduct
grand jury investigations in the absence of additional government
56
personnel.
In a sense, the government personnel are merely
57
extensions of the government attorney. Under this exception (the
“law enforcement exception”), such personnel are only permitted to
use grand jury materials to assist the attorney in enforcing federal
58
criminal law. Any knowing violation of this secrecy obligation may
59
be considered a contempt of court. Furthermore, the government
attorney is required to promptly notify the court of any disclosure
and to specify the government personnel to whom disclosure was
60
made.
The 1977 amendment also expressly provided for the
50

Id. § 8.4.2.
Id. § 8.4.3.
52
In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982).
53
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (1976) (amended 1977).
54
The original advisory committee note to the 1944 version of Rule 6(e) states
that “[g]overnment attorneys are entitled to disclosure of grand jury proceedings,
other than the deliberations and the votes of the jurors, inasmuch as they may be
present in the grand jury room during the presentation of evidence.” FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 41, at 243.
55
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (2001) (amended 2002).
56
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (1977 amendments).
57
See S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 530
(“Attorneys for the Government in the performance of their duties with a grand jury
must possess the authority to utilize the services of other government employees.”).
58
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
59
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7).
60
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
51
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sanction of contempt for the unauthorized disclosure of grand jury
61
materials. In part, this provision was intended to “allay the concerns
of those who fear that such prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of
62
the grand jury to enforce non-criminal Federal laws.”
In 1983, Rule 6(e) was amended to permit government attorneys
63
to share grand jury materials with other federal grand juries. Again,
this exception (the “grand-juror exception”) is not inconsistent with
the doctrine of grand jury secrecy: Grand jurors to whom the
64
information is disclosed are bound by their oaths of secrecy. Finally,
in 1985, Rule 6(e) was amended to clarify that state and local
government personnel are included within the definition of
government personnel to whom disclosure by a government attorney
65
is permitted. To further safeguard grand jury secrecy, rulemakers
required the government attorney making the disclosure to warn the
government personnel (federal, state, or local) of the obligation of
66
secrecy.
2.

United States v. Sells Engineering: A Narrow
Interpretation

The United States Supreme Court provided perhaps the most
significant interpretation of Rule 6(e) in United States v. Sells
67
Engineering, Inc.
The Court was asked to determine whether
government attorneys working for the Civil Division of the Justice
Department could access grand jury materials for the purpose of
68
preparing a civil suit.
The Government argued that, since the
attorneys for the Civil Division fell within the category of “attorneys
for the government,” such materials could automatically be disclosed
69
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i), the government-attorney exception.
70
Despite agreeing that Civil Division attorneys fell within that class,
61

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (2001) (amended 2002) (“A knowing violation of Rule
6 may be punished as a contempt of court.”) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(7)).
62
S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531.
63
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii) (2000) (amended 2001) (current version at
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)).
64
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee’s note (1983 amendments).
65
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (2001) (amended 2002).
66
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
67
463 U.S. 418 (1983).
68
Id. at 420.
69
Id. at 427.
70
Id. at 427–28 (noting that “Rule 54(c) defines the phrase expansively, to
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the Court concluded that the Government was not entitled to
71
automatic disclosure. Specifically, the Court explained that “[t]he
policies of Rule 6 require that any disclosure to attorneys other than
72
prosecutors be judicially supervised rather than automatic.”
The Court, narrowly interpreting the exception, found that the
government-attorney exception only permits disclosure “in the
73
performance of such attorney’s duty.” In so doing, the Court ruled
that “preparation and litigation of a civil suit by a Justice Department
attorney who had no part in conducting the related criminal
prosecution” does not fall within that category of duties covered by
74
the exception. Driven by “the strong historic policy of preserving
75
grand jury secrecy,” the Court found “disclosure for civil use
76
unjustified by the considerations supporting prosecutorial access.”
In other words, the Court ruled that grand juries may function
77
perfectly well without such disclosure.
The Court’s analysis, however, did not conclude with this
finding. Greatly concerned that broad disclosure would increase “the
risk of inadvertent or illegal release to others” and “render[]
considerably more concrete the threat to the willingness of witnesses
78
to come forward and to testify fully and candidly,” the Court took
great pains to articulate the “affirmative mischief” such disclosure
79
could cause.
Moreover, the Court expressed concern for “the
integrity of the grand jury itself,” fearing that the institution might be
used for purposes other than criminal investigation and that such
80
misuse might be difficult to ascertain.
include ‘authorized assistants of the Attorney General’” (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 54
(1982) (currently as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(b)(1)(A)))). The Attorney
General may direct any Justice Department attorney to conduct “any kind of legal
proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §
515(a) (2000).
71
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 435.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 428.
74
Id. at 428–35.
75
Id. at 428.
76
Id. at 431.
77
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 431.
78
Id. at 432.
79
Id. at 431.
80
Id. at 432–33. A third concern was that the “use of grand jury materials by
government agencies in civil or administrative settings threatens to subvert the
limitations applied outside the grand jury context on the Government’s powers of
discovery and investigation.” Id. at 433.
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The Government also sought disclosure under then-Rule
81
which
permitted
court-ordered
disclosure
6(e)(3)(C)(i),
82
“preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” In
doing so, the Government attempted to distinguish between cases
involving disclosure to government officials and those involving
83
disclosure to private parties.
When government officials seek
disclosure “in furtherance of their responsibility to protect the public
weal,” the Government argued, those officials should not be required
84
to demonstrate particularized need. At the heart of this argument
lies the notion that “disclosure of grand jury materials to government
attorneys typically implicates few, if any, of the concerns that underlie
85
the policy of grand jury secrecy.” While acknowledging that the
Government’s contention had “some validity,” the Court found the
86
As a result, the Court refused to waive
argument “overstated.”
application of the particularized-need standard to government
87
officials.
Thus, prior to September 11th, the only persons to whom grand
jury materials could be disclosed without prior judicial approval were
government attorneys involved in federal criminal investigations,
government personnel assisting government attorneys in federal
criminal investigations, and federal grand jurors. Each of these
groups is essential to the functioning of a federal grand jury, and
88
each has an obligation of secrecy under Rule 6(e)(2). All others
81

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) (2001) (amended 2002) (currently at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)).
82
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 442 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 443 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the Government
sought to avoid the application of the standard articulated in Douglas Oil Co. of
California v. Petrol Stops Northwest:
Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under Rule 6(e) must show that
the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another
judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater than the
need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to
cover only material so needed . . . .
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 443 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,
441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85
Id. at 444–45.
86
Id. at 445.
87
Id. at 444–45 (noting, however, that “the standard itself accommodates any
relevant considerations, peculiar to Government movants, that weigh for or against
disclosure in a given case”).
88
On September 11, 2001, Rule 6(e) read:
(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings.
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(1) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand
jury is deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by
an electronic recording device. An unintentional failure of any
recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall not
affect the validity of the prosecution. The recording or reporter’s
notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain in the custody
or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered
by the court in a particular case.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a
stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who
transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any
person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this
subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury,
except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this
rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of
court.
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters
occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the
vote of any grand juror, may be made to—
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance
of such attorney’s duty; and
(ii) such government personnel (including personnel of a state
or subdivision of a state) as are deemed necessary by an attorney for
the government to assist an attorney for the government in the
performance of such attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under
subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury
material for any purpose other than assisting the attorney for the
government in the performance of such attorney’s duty to enforce
federal criminal law. An attorney for the government shall promptly
provide the district court, before which was impaneled the grand jury
whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the persons to
whom such disclosure has been made, and shall certify that the
attorney has advised such persons of their obligation of secrecy under
this rule.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters
occurring before the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant,
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury;
(iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for the
government to another federal grand jury; or
(iv) when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for
the government, upon a showing that such matters may disclose a
violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate official of a state or
subdivision of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the
grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time,
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seeking disclosure, including government officials, were required to
89
obtain judicial approval by demonstrating particularized need.
C. Rule 6(e) After September 11th
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed lives and
laws. Within fifteen months after the attacks, Congress had enacted
two massive pieces of legislation aimed at addressing the terrorist
and under such conditions as the court may direct.
(D) A petition for disclosure pursuant to subdivision (e)(3)(C)(i)
shall be filed in the district where the grand jury convened. Unless the
hearing is ex parte, which it may be when the petitioner is the
government, the petitioner shall serve written notice of the petition
upon (i) the attorney for the government, (ii) the parties to the
judicial proceeding if disclosure is sought in connection with such a
proceeding, and (iii) such other persons as the court may direct. The
court shall afford those persons a reasonable opportunity to appear
and be heard.
(E) If the judicial proceeding giving rise to the petition is in a
federal district court in another district, the court shall transfer the
matter to that court unless it can reasonably obtain sufficient
knowledge of the proceeding to determine whether disclosure is
proper. The court shall order transmitted to the court to which the
matter is transferred the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible,
and a written evaluation of the need for continued grand jury secrecy.
The court to which the matter is transferred shall afford the
aforementioned persons a reasonable opportunity to appear and be
heard.
(4) Sealed Indictments. The federal magistrate judge to whom an
indictment is returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret
until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial.
Thereupon the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall
disclose the return of the indictment except when necessary for the
issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
(5) Closed Hearing. Subject to any right to an open hearing in
contempt proceedings, the court shall order a hearing on matters
affecting a grand jury proceeding to be closed to the extent necessary
to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury.
(6) Sealed Records. Records, orders and subpoenas relating to grand
jury proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent and for such
time as is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a
grand jury.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (2000) (amended Oct. 26, 2001).
89
The requirement that a person seeking disclosure of grand jury materials
establish a “particularized need” also applies when a defendant seeks disclosure
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii). United States v. Broyles, 37 F.3d 1314, 1318 (8th
Cir. 1994); accord Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400
(1959) (applying original version of Rule 6(e) and concluding that “the burden . . .
is on the defense to show that ‘a particularized need’ exists for the [grand jury]
minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy”).
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90

threat: the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”) and the
91
Homeland Security Act of 2002. Following the release of the 9/11
92
Commission Report in July 2004, Congress responded, yet again, by
enacting the far-reaching Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
93
Prevention Act of 2004. Each significantly amended the provisions
of Rule 6(e).
1.

The Patriot Act Amendments

Following September 11th, bipartisan recognition of the need
for increased cooperation between law enforcement and the
94
intelligence community grew.
Shortly thereafter, tools to
implement such cooperation were integrated into the war on
terrorism. The Patriot Act was intended to “deter and punish
terrorist acts in the United States and around the world” and
95
“enhance law enforcement investigatory tools.” Its key function was
to break down the historic barriers between federal law enforcement
96
and the intelligence community.
a.

The Amendment of Rule 6(e)

Concerned that in the course of criminal investigations grand

90

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 10756, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections
of 18, 22, 28 and 50 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter Patriot Act]. .
91
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (to be
codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 5, 6, and 18 U.S.C.).
92
NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT (2004).
93
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
94
See 147 CONG. REC. S10,560 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(“In this new war, terrorists are a hybrid between domestic criminals and
international agents.
We must lower the barriers that discourage our law
enforcement and intelligence agencies from working together to stop these
terrorists. These hybrid criminals call for new, hybrid tools.”); id. at S10,556
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[F]ew would disagree that information learned in a
criminal investigation that is necessary to combating terrorism or protecting the
national security ought to be shared with the appropriate intelligence and national
security officials.”).
95
115 Stat. at 272.
96
See Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to
Bring Domestic Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2001, at A4; supra
note 94.
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juries would obtain information that could prevent terrorist acts,
Congress included a provision in the Patriot Act amending Rule 6(e)
98
to permit disclosure of grand jury materials without judicial
99
approval
when
the
matters
involve
foreign
intelligence
or
counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National
100
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence
101
information (as defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph), to
97

For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham offered the following
hypothetical:
Let me give a couple of hypothetical but eerily-close-to-reality
examples. It is likely that there are, tonight, grand juries meeting at
various places in the United States to deal with issues related to the
events of September 11. Witnesses may be providing information—
information about training camps in Afghanistan, ground warfare
techniques used by al-Qaida and the Taliban, the types and quantity of
weapons available. This type of information will be critical for the
military—critical for the military now, not 2 years from now when these
cases might go to trial.
147 CONG. REC. S10,566 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Graham).
98
Under the new provision, disclosure “may” be made, but is not required. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(D)). But see infra text accompanying notes 119–35 (discussing Attorney
General’s information-sharing guidelines).
99
The House of Representatives’ version of this bill would have required judicial
intervention. H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, § 353 (2001).
100
“The term ‘foreign intelligence’ means information relating to the capabilities,
intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.” 50 U.S.C. §
401a(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2001). “The term ‘counterintelligence’ means information
gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or
international terrorist activities.” Id. § 401a(3).
101
Clause (iv) defines “foreign intelligence information” as:
(I) information, whether or not concerning a United States person,
that relates to the ability of the United States to protect against—
(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of foreign power; or
(II) information, whether or not concerning a United States person,
with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to—
(aa) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
Patriot Act § 202(a)(iv), 115 Stat. at 279–80 (codified as amended at FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(D)(iii)).
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any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or national security official in
order to assist the official receiving that information in the
102
performance of his official duties.

Although Congress’ expressed goal was to prevent terrorism, the
definitions used encompass an extraordinarily broad range of
information, including information unrelated to a threat against the
United States or its citizens. For example, “foreign intelligence”
103
includes information relating to the act of a foreign person.
Conceivably, this could include a foreign citizen’s plans to take part
in a peaceful protest here or abroad or even to buy a loaf of bread.
This new exception (the “Patriot intelligence exception”) differs
from other exceptions to Rule 6(e) secrecy in two critical respects.
First, the Patriot intelligence exception permits prosecutors, acting
solely on their own authority, to disclose grand jury materials to
104
persons who are not involved in the prosecution of federal crimes.
Unlike those traditional exceptions granting prosecutors the right to
105
disclose grand jury materials, this exception is not grounded in
what is necessary to the proper functioning of the grand jury. A
grand jury’s function is to determine whether there is probable cause
106
that a crime has occurred, not to determine whether a crime could
occur in the future. Under the traditional exceptions, a prosecutor
might, for example, instruct an FBI agent to obtain physical evidence
for submission to the grand jury. To obtain the additional evidence
needed by the grand jury to reach a just result, the prosecutor might
find it necessary to disclose grand jury materials to the agent. In
short, the disclosure would be made with the intent to serve the
grand jury.
In contrast, the purpose of the Patriot intelligence exception is
fundamentally different. A prosecutor could, for example, report the
existence of a financial link between a recent immigrant and a
suspected terrorist to an immigration official who was not working for
the prosecutor and would not be expected to report back to the
grand jury. Moreover, the immigration official could use that
102

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V) (2001) (amended 2002) (current version at
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)).
103
See supra note 100.
104
Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 Poses a
New Threat to Grand Jury Secrecy, 9 BUS. CRIMES BULL. 1, 1 (Feb. 2002).
105
See supra notes 53–66 and accompanying text.
106
BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 13, § 3.1.
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information as part of a deportation proceeding. In other words,
disclosures completely unrelated to the functioning of the grand jury
are permissible.
Second, the Patriot intelligence exception allows disclosure of
grand jury information to persons who are not subject to the same
secrecy obligations as other categories of persons to whom grand jury
materials may be disclosed without judicial intervention. Pursuant to
Rule 6(e)(2)(B), grand jurors, attorneys for the government, and
persons to whom disclosure is made under the law enforcement
exception are not permitted to disclose matters occurring before the
107
grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in the rules.
To
illustrate, an FBI agent who receives grand jury materials pursuant to
108
the law enforcement exception may not share those materials with
other persons.
Under the Patriot intelligence exception, however, the
obligation of secrecy imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to
persons obtaining information. Instead, Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(i) provides
that federal officials receiving information under the new exception
“may use the information only as necessary in the conduct of that
person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized
109
disclosure of such information.”
The Patriot Act provides no
110
explicit sanction for officials who violate this limitation. Indeed, as
a practical matter, because no record of those receiving information
is filed with the court overseeing the grand jury, identification of
111
violators is unlikely.

107

FED. R. CRIM P. 6(e)(2)(B).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
109
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i); see 50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (Supp. I 2001)
(authorizing sharing of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information
“obtained as part of a criminal investigation” with federal intelligence officials, etc.,
and mandating that such information be used “only as necessary in the conduct of
the person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure
of such information”).
110
A court might attempt to rely upon its inherent powers to order a contempt
sanction. See supra note 41.
111
Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(ii) merely provides that “[w]ithin a reasonable time after
disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must file,
under seal, a notice with the court . . . stating that such information was disclosed
and the departments, agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.” Its
failure to require prosecutors to specifically identify the federal officials to whom
disclosure is made contrasts sharply with the requirement that government
personnel to whom disclosure is made pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) be identified.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B).
108
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Arguably, the Patriot intelligence exception significantly
112
undermines the doctrine of grand jury secrecy. Unlike traditional
exceptions authorizing disclosure for purposes unrelated to the
113
grand jury function, the Patriot intelligence exception does not
require judicial intervention or a demonstration of particularized
need.
b.

The Adoption of Information-Sharing Guidelines

During the debates over the Patriot Act, certain members of
114
Congress voiced concern over the lack of judicial oversight. In the
end, however, Congress’ desire to take swift action to prevent future
terrorist attacks prevailed.
Conversely, Congress included a
mechanism for limiting disclosure. Section 905(a) of the Patriot Act
requires the Attorney General to develop guidelines for information
sharing between federal law enforcement agencies and the
115
intelligence community. These guidelines were to be promulgated
after consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence
116
Nevertheless, the new guidelines, issued on
Agency (CIA).
September 23, 2002, by Attorney General John Ashcroft, do little to
117
safeguard grand jury secrecy.
In fact, the guidelines make it more
likely that grand jury materials will be disclosed. While the Patriot
118
intelligence exception permits disclosure to federal intelligence
119
officials, “these guidelines require expeditious disclosure.”
112

Nathan & Man, supra note 104, at 1.
See supra notes 30–38, 67–89 and accompanying text.
114
147 CONG. REC. S10,556 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Graham).
115
Patriot Act § 905(a), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. at 388–89 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 403-5b (Supp. I 2001)).
116
Id.
117
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of Department
of Justice Components & Heads of Federal Departments & Agencies with Law
Enforcement Responsibilities, Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of
Central Intelligence and Homeland Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence
Acquired in the Course of a Criminal Investigation (Sept. 23, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/section905a.pdf [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum I].
118
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
119
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2 (emphasis added).
Specifically, Guideline 2 states:
Law Enforcement Information Subject to Mandatory Disclosure. Subject to
any exceptions established by the Attorney General in consultation
with the Director of Central Intelligence (the “Director”) and the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, section 905(a) and
these guidelines require expeditious disclosure to the Director, the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security or other members of
113
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The guidelines allow for “exemptions from the mandatory
120
disclosure obligation.” Requests for exemption “must be submitted
by the department, component or agency head in writing [i.e., the
United States Attorney] with a complete description of the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the need for an exception and why lesser
121
measures such as use restrictions are not adequate.” The Attorney
122
General, on a case-by-case basis, makes the final determination as to
123
whether an exemption is warranted.
The standard created by the guidelines is the exact opposite of
that applied in every other situation involving prosecutorial release of
grand jury materials. Instead of a presumption of secrecy, the
guidelines create a presumption of disclosure. Rather than requiring
a particularized showing of the need for disclosure, the guidelines
require a particularized showing of the need for secrecy.
Furthermore, the guidelines allow for the “originator” of the
the U.S. intelligence community or homeland security agencies as are
designated under paragraph 4, infra, of foreign intelligence acquired
in the course of a criminal investigation conducted by Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies.
a. As used herein, the term “foreign intelligence” is defined in section
3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a) as:
“information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”
b. The term “section 905(a) information” means foreign intelligence
acquired in the course of a criminal investigation.
c. Section 203(d) of the USA PATRIOT Act provides that:
“Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be lawful for foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 401a)) or foreign
intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal investigation to
be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or national security official in order to
assist the official receiving that information in the performance of his
official duties.” Thus, no other Federal or state law operates to prevent
the sharing of such information so long as disclosure of such
information will assist the Director and the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security in the performance of their official duties, and
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies shall, notwithstanding any other
law, expeditiously disclose to the Recipients (as defined below) section
905(a) information.
120
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 9, at 6.
121
Id. Guideline 9(c), at 6.
122
Id.
123
Id. Guideline 9(b), at 6. In making this determination, the Attorney General is
to consult with the CIA Director and the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security. Id.
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124

information to partially restrict its use.
As a general rule,
information disclosed under the guidelines will be disclosed “free of
125
any originator controls or information use restrictions.”
Use of
grand jury materials may be restricted “to comply with notice and
record keeping requirements and to protect sensitive law
enforcement sources and ongoing criminal investigations and
126
prosecutions.” Any restrictions on use, however, “shall be no more
127
restrictive than necessary to accomplish the desired effect.” Unless
the information contained within the grand jury materials relates to
potential terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, the prosecuting
128
official assigned to the case must be consulted prior to disclosure.
Again, this rule runs counter to the standard applied to every
other prosecutorial release of grand jury materials. In the absence of
use restrictions, as long as recipients of the materials believe that
disclosure is necessary to conduct their duties, they may share the
129
information with anyone they choose.
Under the pre-September
11th exceptions, “second generation” recipients did not exist. Those
who received grand jury materials from a prosecutor were prohibited
130
from re-disclosing them to further-removed recipients. Conversely,
now neither Rule 6(e) nor the guidelines purport to limit second
generation recipients’ use of grand jury materials. Once this level of
disclosure is reached, any pretense of secrecy is a thing of the past.
Notably, the Attorney General’s guidelines differentiate
between, on the one hand, the treatment of materials relating to “a

124

Id. Guideline 8, at 6.
Id. Guideline 8(a), at 6.
126
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 8(c), at 6.
127
Id. Guideline 8(b)(i), at 6.
128
Id. Guideline 5(c), at 4–5. The disclosure must be made “no later than 48
hours after the prosecutor is initially notified.” Id at 4.
129
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i). Executive Order No. 12,333 may afford
“United States persons” some protections. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg.
59,941, 59,950 (Dec. 4, 1981). The order limits intelligence agencies’ ability “to
collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons.” Id.
Before disclosing grand jury materials identifying United States persons to federal
intelligence officials, the prosecutor must label the materials as containing
identifying information. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to
Heads of Department Components, Guidelines for Disclosure of Grand Jury and
Electronic, Wire, and Oral Interception Information Identifying United States
Persons 1 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/section203.pdf.
Under certain circumstances, the receiving agency may delete identifying references
to United States persons. Id. at 2.
130
See generally supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text.
125
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potential terrorism or a Weapons of Mass Destruction threat to
the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure, key resources
(whether physical or electronic) or to United States persons or
interests worldwide” and, on the other hand, the treatment of other
grand jury materials subject to disclosure under the Patriot
133
intelligence exception. The former must be disclosed to the proper
authorities “immediately,” while the latter must be disclosed “as
134
expeditiously as possible.” Under the “as expeditiously as possible”
standard, the prosecutor has forty-eight hours to identify use
restrictions or request an exception to the disclosure requirement
135
from the Attorney General.
c.

The Use of the Patriot Intelligence Exception

Any question as to whether the Patriot intelligence exception
would be used was quickly answered. Between September 11, 2001,
and July 26, 2002, there were approximately forty disclosures of
federal grand jury materials containing foreign intelligence
136
information. These disclosures involved thirty-nine separate grand
137
juries.
131

“Terrorism Information” is defined as:
All information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities,
plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support,
or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals
or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States,
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other
nations, or to communications between such groups or individuals, or
information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be
assisting or associated with them.
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 5(a)(i), at 4.
132
“Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Information” is defined as: “All
information relating to conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional
weapons capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of
such weapons.” Id. Guideline 5(a)(ii), at 4.
133
Id. Guideline 5(a), at 3.
134
Id.
135
Id. Guideline 5(a), (c), at 3, 4–5.
136
Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, enclosing
Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committee to the Attorney General on
USA PATRIOT Act Implementation 1 (July 26, 2002) [hereinafter Bryant Letter (July
26, 2002)] (on file with author).
137
Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, enclosing
Follow-up Questions Submitted by the House Judiciary Committee to the Attorney
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Interestingly, twenty-seven of the disclosures made during this
138
On
period involved the use of pre-Patriot Act procedure.
September 20, 2002, the Justice Department informed the House
Judiciary Committee that “grand jury information was shared under
Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii),” the law enforcement exception, which permits
disclosure without court approval to government personnel of materials
139
needed to help prosecutors enforce federal criminal law. However,
on October 4, 2002, the Justice Department reported that the
districts involved “filed a motion and obtained an order from the
140
court permitting such disclosure.”
Given that the law enforcement exception permits disclosure
without a court order, this discrepancy is puzzling. Ostensibly,
prosecutors either sought court approval of a Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii)
disclosure as a check on their decision-making authority or sought
141
disclosure pursuant to former Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), which permitted
court-ordered disclosure. Regardless of which provision was used,
sharing information with the intelligence community is
142
problematic.
If the prosecutor’s purpose is to obtain additional information
for a federal criminal case under investigation, use of the law
143
144
enforcement exception
is legitimate.
If, for example, a
General on USA Patriot Act Implementation 1 (Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Bryant
Letter (Sept. 20, 2002)] (on file with author). Presumably, the bulk of these
disclosures were made prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act.
138
Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable F.
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary 1 (Oct. 4,
2002) [hereinafter Bryant Letter (Oct. 4, 2002)] (on file with author).
139
Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1.
140
Bryant Letter (Oct. 4, 2002), supra note 138, at 1.
141
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (2000) (amended 2001) (currently at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)).
142
Indeed, at least one senator based her support for amending Rule 6(e) on the
belief that “[u]nder current law, law enforcement officials involved in a grand jury
investigation cannot share information gathered in the grand jury with the
intelligence community, even if that information would prevent a future terrorist
act.” 147 CONG. REC. S10,592 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
143
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii).
144
The Justice Department explained,
[i]n the context of the 9/11 investigation, grand jury information was
shared with members of numerous JTTFs [Joint Terrorism Task
Forces] around the country who participated in the PENTBOMB
[September 11th] investigation as well as the representatives of the
various agencies stationed at SIOC [Strategic Information and
Operations Center]. The reason for this is that it is often necessary to
disclose grand jury information to those involved in an investigation in
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prosecutor needed the help of the CIA in obtaining information
about a foreign target to present to the grand jury, a CIA agent might
fall within the category of government personnel to whom disclosure
is permitted. But if the prosecutor’s intent is not to enforce federal
criminal law, but rather to inform the CIA of a threat to national
security, the law enforcement exception does not apply. Additionally,
a CIA agent who receives grand jury materials under this exception
145
may not disclose them to others. If the Justice Department’s intent
in making the disclosures was to address a threat to national security,
an absolute ban on further disclosure seems unworkable.
146
In contrast, former Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), which permitted courtordered disclosure “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding,” would not impose an obligation of secrecy upon the
147
recipient. Again, however, this exception does not appear to apply
to situations in which the disclosure is intended to protect national
148
security interests. In United States v. Baggot, the Supreme Court
strictly construed this language, holding that “the Rule contemplates
only uses related fairly directly to some identifiable litigation,
pending or anticipated. . . . If the primary purpose of disclosure is
not to assist in preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding,
149
disclosure under (C)(i) is not permitted.”
Thus, the fact that
“litigation is factually likely to emerge” from an investigation of a
national security threat would not support disclosure under former
150
Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
The remaining disclosures that were made during the period
from September 11, 2001, to July 2002, were made pursuant to the
Patriot intelligence exception. According to the Justice Department,
151
all of the reporting districts invoking the new exception had filed

order to take necessary follow-up steps to advance the investigation.
Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1.
145
See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
146
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (2000) (amended 2001) (currently at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)).
147
Rule 6(e)(2)’s obligation of secrecy applies only to grand jurors, interpreters,
persons recording or transcribing testimony, prosecutors, and persons to whom
disclosure is made under the law enforcement exception. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
148
463 U.S. 476 (1983).
149
Id. at 480.
150
Id.
151
At the time the Justice Department made its report, thirty-six of the thirty-eight
districts involved in the disclosure of intelligence materials had reported. Bryant
Letter (Oct. 4, 2002), supra note 138, at 1.
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the required notice of disclosure with the court supervising the grand
152
Thus far, the
jury through which the information was obtained.
supervising courts have not complained about the timeliness of the
153
notices filed.
The Justice Department provided the House Judiciary
154
Committee with a redacted exemplar that provides some helpful
155
insights into how the exception is being used.
The most striking
152

Id.
Id. According to the Justice Department, “[t]he courts supervising the grand
juries are responsible for supervising the filing of notices and for disciplining any
failure to file such notices.” Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1. How
the supervising court would ever learn of a failure to file is an open question.
154
Bryant Letter (Oct. 4, 2002), supra note 138, at 1.
155
The notices are provided in the form of pleadings filed under seal. The
sample notice reads:
Pursuant to Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 279 (2001), codified as Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e)(3)(C), the undersigned attorney for the government hereby
provides notice to the Court regarding the disclosure to certain Federal
departments, agencies, and entities of criminal investigative
information that may include “matters occurring before” the abovecaptioned grand jury regarding xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and
related criminal activity, as follows:
1. Grand juries empaneled in this district have issued subpoenas and
engaged in other investigative activities in conjunction with
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxx and related criminal activity. To the extent that
information relating to the grand juries’s [sic] activities constitutes
“matters occurring before the grand jury” within the meaning of Rule
6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it may not be
disclosed “except as otherwise provided for” under the Rules. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2).
2. Section 203(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, which was signed into
law on October 26, 2001, amends Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) to authorize
disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury:
(V) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as
defined in clause (iv) of this subparagraph), to any Federal law
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense,
or national security official in order to assist the official receiving that
information in the performance of his official duties.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(V).
3. The investigation into the September 11 attacks and related
criminal
activity
involves
such
“foreign
intelligence”
or
“counterintelligence” and “foreign intelligence information.”
Moreover, the sharing of information developed during the
investigation assists a variety of “Federal law enforcement, intelligence,
protective, immigration, national defense, [and] national security
153
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feature of the exemplar is the sheer breadth of the disclosure. The
court is informed that the intelligence interests in question “involve
156
literally thousands of Federal law enforcement and other officials.”
The recipients include everyone from the CIA to the Social Security
157
Administration Inspector General. Such widespread dissemination
of grand jury materials is unprecedented. Under the new exception,
official[s]” in the performance of their official duties. Consequently,
criminal investigative information, which may include matters
occurring before grand juries, has been disclosed and will continue to
be disclosed to such officials. Of course, an official who receives such
information “may use that information only as necessary in the conduct
of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the
unauthorized disclosure of such information.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e)(3)(C)(iii).
4. The amended rule requires that, “[w]ithin a reasonable time after
such disclosure, an attorney for the government shall file under seal a
notice with the court stating the fact that such information was
disclosed and the departments, agencies, or entities to which disclosure
was made.” Id. Unlike the notice required in other contexts, see Fed.
R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(B), in matters involving these sort of intelligence
interests, which may (as in this case) involve literally thousands of
Federal law enforcement and other officials, the rule does not require
the notice to name each individual official to whom the grand jury
information has been disclosed, only their “departments, agencies, or
entities.”
5. Accordingly, the undersigned attorney for the government hereby
notifies the Court that information relating to the above-captioned
grand jury investigations, which may include “matters occurring before
the grand jury,” has been and will be disclosed to the following Federal
departments, agencies, and entities pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
6(e)(C)(i)(V):
(a) Department of Justice (including Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
(b) Department of Treasury.
(c) Department of Defense.
(d) Department of State.
(e) Department of Transportation.
(f) Department of Energy.
(g) Postal Inspection Service.
(h) Central Intelligence Agency.
(i) National Security Agency.
(j) National Security Council.
(k) Naval Criminal Investigative Service [sic]
(l) Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(m) Federal Aviation Administration.
(n) Social Security Administration Inspector General.
Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, app. (alterations in original)
(footnotes omitted).
156
Id.
157
See id.
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prosecutors are not even constrained by the need to list the
158
individual recipients of the information. Unmistakably, passage of
the Patriot Act ushered in a new era in the use of federal grand jury
materials.
2.

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Amendments

The new era continued with the passage of yet more far-reaching
159
legislation in the form of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
160
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
a.

The Homeland Security Act and the Purported
Amendment of Rule 6(e)

While much of the public’s attention to the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 was directed towards provisions creating a new cabinetlevel Department of Homeland Security, the Act also included
161
provisions that purported to amend Rule 6(e) yet again.
The
concern that the improvements in information sharing wrought by
the enactment of the Patriot Act did not go far enough prompted the
162
amendment.
Specifically, legislators expressed their concern that
the Patriot Act failed to bring state and local officials into the
163
These officials were believed to be in the
information loop.
164
vanguard of the war on terrorism.
It was Congress’ sense “that
158

The Justice Department described the Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) requirement that
prosecutors list each individual to whom information is disclosed as “onerous and a
diversion of resources from investigative activity.” Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002),
supra note 137, at 1.
159
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (to be
codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 5, 6, and 18 U.S.C.).
160
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
161
See Homeland Security Act § 895, 116 Stat. at 2256–57. The Homeland
Security Act incorporated provisions from an earlier bill, the Homeland Security
Information Sharing Act, H.R. 4598, 107th Cong. (2002), Homeland Security Act §
891, 116 Stat. at 2252–53 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. § 481 (West Supp. 2004)). See 148
Cong. Rec. H3936–48 (daily ed. June 26, 2002).
162
See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H3939 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
163
See, e.g., id.
164
Congress specifically found that “[s]ome homeland security information is
needed by the State and local personnel to prevent and prepare for terrorist attack”
and that “State and local personnel have capabilities and opportunities to gather
information on suspicious activities and terrorist threats not possessed by Federal
agencies.” Homeland Security Act § 891(b)(4), (8), 116 Stat. at 2252 (codified at 6
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Federal, State, and local entities should share homeland security
165
Legislators also
information to the maximum extent possible.”
voiced concerns that the Patriot Act failed to address the problem of
166
domestic terrorism.
To address these concerns, Congress passed an amendment to
Rule 6(e) that would allow disclosure without judicial approval
when matters involve a threat of actual or potential attack or
other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, domestic or
international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power
or by an agent of a foreign power, within the United States or
elsewhere, to any appropriate federal, state, local, or foreign
government official for the purpose of preventing or responding
167
to such a threat.

U.S.C.A. § 481 (West Supp. 2004)).
165
Id. § 891(c), 116 Stat. at 2253.
166
148 CONG. REC. H3939; see also H.R. REP. NO. 107-534, pt. 1, § 6 (2002)
(“Domestic threat information is included because it is not always clear whether
threats to public safety result from international or domestic terrorism threats. The
anthrax attacks are one example of where the origin of that attacks [sic] is not
clear.”).
167
Homeland Security Act § 895, 116 Stat. at 2256 (codified as amended at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)). The Act also sought to amend the language of existing Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to include personnel of a foreign government among those to whom
an attorney for the government may disclose grand jury materials when needed to
assist in enforcing federal criminal law. Id. § 895(1). Under this provision, a
prosecutor disclosing grand jury materials to a foreign official would be required to
provide the official’s name to the court that impaneled the grand jury. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(3)(B). Foreign officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this
exception would have an obligation of secrecy under existing Rule 6(e)(2).
Additionally, the Act sought to amend then Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I) to expressly allow
a court to order disclosure “upon request by an attorney by the government when
sought by a foreign court or prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.”
Homeland Security Act § 895(2)(B)(i), 116 Stat. at 2256. In so doing, the Act
clarified that at least some foreign proceedings qualify as “judicial proceedings”
under Rule 6. Similarly, the Act sought to amend then Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(IV) to
expressly permit a court to order disclosure of a violation of foreign criminal law to a
foreign official for the purpose of enforcing that law. Id. § 895(2)(B)(ii). This
amendment was considered necessary because,
even when the Government [made] an appropriate showing to the
court (i.e., a showing similar to that required for disclosure of grand
jury material in a domestic proceeding), the rule as . . . written [did]
not expressly authorize courts to order disclosure. As a consequence,
the U.S. prosecutor sometimes [was forced to] re-subpoena the same
information from the original sources.
H.R. REP. NO. 107-534, pt. 1, § 6.
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The Homeland Security Act amendments were supposed to become
168
In drafting the
effective sixty days after their date of enactment.
amendments, however, Congress failed to consider the amendment
and restructuring of Rule 6(e) that came into effect on December 1,
169
2002. This restructuring made the amendments incapable of being
168

Homeland Security Act § 4, 116 Stat. at 2142.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 historical notes to 2002 amendments. As of December 1,
2002, Rule 6(e)(2), (3) read:
(2) Secrecy.
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except
in accordance with Rule
6(e)(2)(B).
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must
not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury:
(i) a grand juror;
(ii) an interpreter;
(iii) a court reporter;
(iv) an operator of a recording device;
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;
(vi) an attorney for the government; or
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii);
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure of a grand jury matter—other than the grand jury’s
deliberations or any grand juror’s vote—may be made to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that
attorney’s duty;
(ii) any government personnel—including those of a state or state
subdivision or of an Indian tribe—that an attorney for the government
considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney’s duty to
enforce federal criminal law; or
(iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
(B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney for
the government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal
criminal law. An attorney for the government must promptly provide
the court that impaneled the grand jury with the names of all persons
to whom a disclosure has been made, and must certify that the attorney
has advised those persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand jury
matter to another federal grand jury.
(D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand jury
matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined
in 50 U.S.C. § 401a), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in
Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii)) to any federal law enforcement, intelligence,
protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official
to assist the official receiving the information in the performance of
that official’s duties.
(i) Any federal official who receives information under Rule
6(e)(3)(D) may use the information only as necessary in the conduct
169
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of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the
unauthorized disclosure of such information.
(ii) Within a reasonable time after disclosure is made under Rule
6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must file, under seal, a
notice with the court in the district where the grand jury convened
stating that such information was disclosed and the departments,
agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.
(iii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(D), the term “foreign intelligence
information” means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States
person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect
against—
• actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power or its agent;
• sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its
agent; or
• clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States
person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates
to—
• the national defense or the security of the United States; or
• the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a manner, and
subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a grand jury matter:
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may
exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred
before the grand jury;
(iii) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter
may disclose a violation of state or Indian tribal criminal law, as long as
the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision, or Indian
tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that law; or
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter
may disclose a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate
military official for the purpose of enforcing that law.
(F) A petition to disclose a grand jury matter under Rule
6(e)(3)(E)(i) must be filed in the district where the grand jury
convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte—as it may be when the
government is the petitioner—the petitioner must serve the petition
on, and the court must afford a reasonable opportunity to appear and
be heard to:
(i) an attorney for the government;
(ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and
(iii) any other person whom the court may designate.
(G) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in
another district, the petitioned court must transfer the petition to the
other court unless the petitioned court can reasonably determine
whether disclosure is proper. If the petitioned court decides to
transfer, it must send to the transferee court the material sought to be
disclosed, if feasible, and a written evaluation of the need for

2005

PRESERVING GRAND JURY SECRECY

525

170

executed.
Although President George W. Bush immediately
indicated that he planned to seek technical amendments from
171
Congress to permit the provisions to go into effect,
these
amendments were never enacted. The fact that Congress amended
Rule 6(e) without taking into account its planned restructuring
underscores the haste with which it reached its decision to alter
centuries-old policies.
b.

The Amendment of Rule 6(e)
172

The release of the 9/11 Commission Report in July 2004 spurred
Congress to further address the issues of intelligence reform and
173
terrorism prevention.
These efforts culminated in the enactment
174
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
which, while perhaps best known for establishing a Director of
National Intelligence, also included provisions affecting grand jury

continued grand jury secrecy. The transferee court must afford those
persons identified in Rule 6(e)(3)(F) a reasonable opportunity to
appear and be heard.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)–(3) (2002) (amended 2004).
Along with restyling Rule 6(e), the 2002 amendments contained some
noteworthy substantive changes. Under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(iii), a prosecutor may
disclose grand jury materials to a government attorney for purposes of enforcing civil
forfeiture and civil banking laws under 18 U.S.C. § 3322. This provision was added to
ensure that the amendments to Rule 6 did not supercede section 3322. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6. advisory committee’s note (2002 amendments). Underlying section 3322 is the
idea that “[b]ecause all civil forfeiture actions are now recognized as law
enforcement functions, grand jury information should be available to government
attorneys for their use in all civil forfeiture cases.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-358, pt. 1, § 8
(1997). Furthermore, Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) now expressly recognizes that to enforce
federal criminal law a prosecutor may need to disclose information to government
personnel of an Indian tribe. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. advisory committee’s note (2002
amendments).
170
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 historical notes to 2002 amendments. The renumbering of
Rule 6(e)’s sections made it impossible to make the requested insertions. See
Statement of President George W. Bush on the Signing of H.R. 5005, the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (Nov. 25, 2002), 2002 WL 31650677, at *5 [hereinafter
President’s Statement].
171
President’s Statement, supra note 170, at *5.
172
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT (2004).
173
See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S11,859 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Frist).
174
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, 118 Stat. 3638 (to be codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
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175

secrecy.
These provisions were intended to restore the
176
In certain
amendments created by the Homeland Security Act.
respects, the changes that the Patriot Act wrought to Rule 6(e) pale
in comparison to those Congress created via the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act. The amendments to Rule 6 within
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act further erode
the doctrine of grand jury secrecy.
Most significantly, one
amendment creates a new exception which allows disclosure without
judicial approval of
any grand jury matter involving, within the United States or
elsewhere, a threat of attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power or its agent, a threat of domestic or international
sabotage or terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power
or by its agent, to any appropriate Federal, State, State
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official, for the
177
purpose of preventing or responding to such threat or activities.

By permitting prosecutors to disclose grand jury materials to
persons who are not intimately involved in the prosecution of federal
crimes, Congress has again created an exception that fundamentally
178
diverges from the traditional exceptions.
In contrast to the
traditional exceptions controlling disclosure to persons unrelated to
179
the new exception (the “terrorism
the grand jury function,
prevention exception”) requires no judicial intervention and no
175

Id. § 6501(a), 118 Stat. at 3760 (codified at FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)).
150 CONG. REC. S11,995 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
177
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a) (codified at FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(d). The Act also amends the language of existing Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) to include personnel of a foreign government among those to whom
an attorney for the government may disclose grand jury materials when needed to
assist in enforcing federal criminal law. Id. § 6501(a)(1)(A). Under this provision, a
prosecutor disclosing grand jury materials to a foreign official would be required to
provide the official’s name to the court that impaneled the grand jury. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(3)(B). Foreign officials receiving grand jury materials pursuant to this
exception would have an obligation of secrecy under existing Rule 6(e)(2).
Additionally, the Act adds Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(iii) to expressly allow a court to order
disclosure “at the request of the government, when sought by a foreign court or
prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation.” Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a)(1)(C)(ii). In so doing, the Act clarified that at
least some foreign proceedings qualify as “judicial proceedings” under Rule 6.
Similarly, the Act amended existing Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(iv) to expressly permit a court
to order disclosure of a violation of foreign criminal law to a foreign official for the
purpose of enforcing that law. Id. § 6501(a)(1)(C)(iii).
178
See supra notes 54–66 and accompanying text.
179
See supra notes 67–89 and accompanying text.
176
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180

showing of particularized need.
Several aspects of this new exception are disquieting. First, the
Act poorly defines the types of information subject to disclosure. In
drafting the Patriot Act amendments, Congress specifically defined
“foreign intelligence” and other categories of information that may
181
be disclosed.
Although arguably broad, these definitions place
some limits on disclosure. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, on the other hand, provides no such limits. For
182
example, “domestic . . . terrorism”
is susceptible to multiple
interpretations. If a prosecutor learns via grand jury testimony of a
planned antiwar sit-in, may the prosecutor inform intelligence
183
officials of the identity of the demonstration’s planners?
The
question of where “ordinary” crime ends and “domestic terrorism”
184
begins is left unanswered.
Second, because information may be given to any “appropriate”
185
official, the Act does not limit the categories of government officials
to whom information may be disclosed. While Congressional
186
187
testimony and debate on both the Homeland Security Act and the
180

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
182
See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a), 118 Stat.
at 3760.
183
Allowing individual prosecutors to determine when disclosure is warranted will
likely lead to inconsistent interpretations.
184
Federal criminal law defines “domestic terrorism” as activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be
intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
185
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6501(a)(1)(B)(i).
186
See, e.g., A Review of the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act: Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary
Comm. Subcomm. On Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Jonathan Turley, Professor, George Washington University Law
School) (“This provision allows for the sharing of national security and grand-jury
information with state and local governments. It was previously enacted by Congress
and has only been reintroduced due to the Supreme Court’s revision of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.”); The Homeland Security Information Sharing Act: Hearing
on H.R. 4598 Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Rep. Chambliss).
187
See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S11,995 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Kyl); 148 CONG. REC. H3941–42 (daily ed. June 26, 2002) (statement of Rep.
181
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Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act amendments centered on
the need to involve state and local officials in the war on terrorism,
the new exception also permits disclosure to foreign officials.
188
Nothing in the Congressional record explains this decision.
Indeed, there is no discussion of the unique risks disclosure to
noncitizens and nonresidents might create for the grand jury process.
Moreover, the language of the terrorism prevention exception
contrasts sharply with that of the Patriot intelligence exception,
189
which provides a list of approved categories of disclosees.
Given
that the terrorism prevention exception is intended to prevent acts
such as terrorism and sabotage, and that the circumstances
surrounding such acts would be highly variable, the desire to allow
some leeway as to the selection of the appropriate official is
190
understandable.
Nonetheless, the complete lack of boundaries
creates unprecedented access to grand jury materials.
Perhaps because Congress had already approved the terrorism
191
prevention exception as part of the Homeland Security Act, its
inclusion in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
192
elicited almost no comment.
Though legislators involved in the
Weiner).
188
Still, the possible ramifications of this provision did not go unnoticed by all. In
analyzing the potential amendment, the Congressional Research Service noted, “It
remains to be seen how the courts will respond to the use of the grand jury as an
intelligence gathering device for foreign officials.” CONG. RESEARCH SERV., H.R. 10
(9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT) AND S. 2845 (NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004): A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 41 (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32635.pdf (updated Oct. 21, 2004).
189
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
190
Rule 6(e) permits disclosure to “any appropriate Federal, State, State
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official.” FED. R. CRIM P.
6(e)(3)(D). The term “appropriate” is neither defined nor limited in any way. See
id.
191
Homeland Security Act § 895, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. at 2156. See supra
notes 172–180 and accompanying text.
192
During the consideration of the conference report on the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Senator John Kyl provided the sole
commentatry on the changes to Rule 6(e). His analysis was as follows:
Subtitle F, section 6501, Sharing Grand-Jury Information With State
and Local Governments, this section amends current law to authorize
the sharing of grand-jury information with appropriate state and local
authorities.
I do not think that one can overstate the importance of information
sharing, of tearing down the walls that prevent different parts of the
Government from exchanging intelligence and working together in
the war on terror. A graphic illustration of the importance of
streamlined information sharing is provided by another pre-September
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11 investigation. Like the Moussaoui case, this investigation also came
tantalizing close to substantially disrupting or even stopping the 9/11
plot, and also ultimately was blocked by a flaw in our antiterror laws.
The investigation to which I refer involved Khalid Al Midhar [sic], one
of the suicide hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77, which was
crashed into the Pentagon, killing 58 passengers and crew and 125
people on the ground.
An account of the investigation of Midhar [sic] is provided in the 9/11
Commission’s staff Statement No. 10. That statement notes as follows:
During the summer of 2001 <an FBI official> . . . found <a> cable
reporting that Khalid Al Mihdhar had a visa to the United States. A
week later she found the cable reporting that Mihdhar’s visa
application—what was later discovered to be his first application—
listed New York as his destination. . . . The FBI official grasped the
significance of this information.
The FBI official and an FBI analyst working the case promptly met with
an INS representative at FBI Headquarters. On August 22 INS told
them that Mihdhar had entered the United States on January 15, 2000,
and again on July 4, 2001. . . . The FBI agents decided that if Mihdhar
was in the United States, he should be found.
These alert agents immediately grasped the danger that Khalid Al
Midhar [sic] posed to the United States, and immediately initiated an
effort to track him down. Unfortunately, at the time, the law was not
on their side. The Joint Inquiry Report of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees describes what happened next:
Even in late August 2001, when the CIA told the FBI, State, INS, and
Customs that Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and two other “Bin
Laden-related individuals” were in the United States, FBI Headquarters
refused to accede to the New York field office recommendation that a
criminal investigation be opened, which might allow greater resources
to be dedicated to the search for the future hijackers. . . . FBI attorneys
took the position that criminal investigators “CAN NOT” (emphasis
original) be involved and that criminal information discovered in the
intelligence case would be “passed over the wall” according to proper
procedures. An agent in the FBI’s New York field office responded by
e-mail, saying: “Whatever has happened to this, someday someone will
die and, wall or not, the public will not understand why we were not
more effective in throwing every resource we had at certain problems.”
The 9/11 Commission staff report assesses the ultimate impact of these
legal barriers:
Many witnesses have suggested that even if Mihdhar had been found,
there was nothing the agents could have done except follow him onto
the planes. We believe this is incorrect. Both Hazmi and Mihdhar
could have been held for immigration violations or as material
witnesses in the Cole bombing case. Investigation or interrogation of
these individuals, and their travel and financial activities, also may have
yielded evidence of connections to other participants in the 9/11 plot.
In any case, the opportunity did not arise.
Congress must do what it can now to make sure that something like
this does not happen again—that arbitrary, seemingly minor
bureaucratic barriers are not allowed to undermine our best leads
toward uncovering an attack on the United States. Section 6501 is a
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passage of the Homeland Security Act expressed some concern over
193
the disclosure of grand jury information, they believed that the
proposed amendments contained adequate safeguards to protect
194
grand jury secrecy.
As with persons receiving grand jury materials
under the Patriot intelligence exception, the obligation of secrecy
imposed by Rule 6(e)(2) does not apply to persons obtaining
information under the terrorism prevention exception. Still, there
are some limitations on use. Officials receiving grand jury materials
pursuant to this exception may use it only as needed in the conduct
195
of their duties. Specifically, officials must use the materials for the
purpose specified by the exception: “preventing or responding to . . .
196
[a] threat.”
Joint guidelines from the Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence may impose additional limitations
197
on use by state, local, and foreign officials. Those officials may be
198
punished for contempt of court for any violation of that obligation.
The effectiveness of these safeguards remains to be seen. As
199
with the Patriot intelligence exception, there is no requirement that
prosecutors identify individual recipients of grand jury materials to
the court overseeing the grand jury. Prosecutors need only file a
notice with the court indicating that the information was disclosed
200
and identifying the entity receiving the materials.
Furthermore,
substantial step in that direction.
The change made be section 6501 previously was enacted by the
Homeland Security Act, but that change never went into effect because
the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure amended by the HSA was
revised by the Supreme Court shortly after the enactment of the HSA,
and the amendment made by HSA presupposed the earlier text of the
Federal rule. The same provisions were introduced as part of S. 2599
by Senators CHAMBLISS and me on June 24, 2004.
150 CONG. REC. S11,995 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2004) (ellipses and alterations in angle
brackets in original).
193
148 CONG. REC. H3942 (daily ed. June 26, 2002) (statement of Rep. Weiner)
(“I share the concerns that some raised in committee that we do not want this
information to chip away at the confidentiality of the grand jury.”).
194
Id. at H3939 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (noting that “[t]he
information may only be disclosed for the specified purpose of preventing and
responding to a threat. Additionally, recipients may only use the disclosed
information in the conduct of their official duties as is necessary, and they are subject
to the restrictions for unauthorized disclosures, including contempt of court”).
195
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i).
196
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
197
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i).
198
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7).
199
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
200
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(ii).
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with the exception of the contempt sanction created for violations of
201
the joint guidelines discussed above, Congress again failed to
expressly grant the judiciary the power to impose contempt
202
sanctions. How a court might be expected to impose sanctions for
contempt without knowing the identity of the person or persons to
whom disclosure was made is a mystery.
c.

The Future of Rule 6(e)

In a period of little over three years, Congress has fundamentally
altered a doctrine of grand jury secrecy that has been revered and
203
protected for centuries.
It did so in a time of national crisis and
without the notice and comment traditionally accompanying changes
204
to the rules of procedure. Now is an opportune time for Congress
to reflect on the changes it has wrought. As it considers whether
other measures enacted under the Patriot Act should be
reauthorized, it would be prudent for Congress to revisit the postSeptember 11th amendments and reevaluate both their
constitutionality and their impact upon the functioning of the grand
jury.
II. GRAND JURY SECRECY AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
205
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”
The parameters of
this right, however, have yet to be fully defined. In particular, the
United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether the
right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings is implicit in a person’s
right to indictment by a grand jury. The examination of whether
Congress should rethink the recent amendments to Rule 6(e) begins
201

See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
Again, the courts may possess the inherent power to impose this sanction. See
Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988); see also United States v.
Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 20 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Schiavo, 375 F. Supp. 475, 478
(E.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 309 n.40 (N.D. Cal. 1952);
4 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 41, at 20.
203
See discussion supra Part I.A & B.
204
See Michael Fitzpatrick, Code Orange: Will It Be Used To “End-Run” Federal
Rulemaking Requirements?, 29 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 11 (2004). See generally FEDERAL
RULEMAKING, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
205
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
202
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with an analysis of whether grand jury secrecy has constitutional
underpinnings. Given the magnitude of their consequences, the
recent amendments to Rule 6(e) should compel Congress (if not the
courts) to reevaluate this thorny issue.
A. Costello v. United States: The Final Word on Grand Jury
Rights?
206

In Costello v. United States, the Supreme Court presented its
clearest statement of the rights guaranteed by the Grand Jury Clause.
The defendant in that case, Frank Costello, was indicted for and
ultimately convicted of willfully attempting to avoid federal income
207
taxes. Both during and after trial, the defendant moved to dismiss
the indictment on the ground that it was based solely upon hearsay
208
evidence, thus violating the Grand Jury Clause. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied his
motion and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
209
Circuit affirmed.
In upholding the lower courts’ rulings, the
Supreme Court concluded, “[a]n indictment returned by a legally
constituted and unbiased grand jury . . . if valid on its face, is enough
to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment
210
requires nothing more.”
Standing alone, Costello could be read to stand for the
proposition that the right to indictment by a grand jury does not
211
encompass the right to secrecy of grand jury proceedings. That is,
if a grand jury is legally constituted, unbiased, and issues an
212
indictment, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. Indeed, a
few lower courts have specifically held that because the right to
secrecy “was never intended as a safeguard for the interests of the
213
accused,” it cannot be viewed as incorporated into the Fifth
Amendment rights of the accused.
206

350 U.S. 359 (1956).
Id. at 359–61.
208
Id. at 361.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 363.
211
See id. at 359.
212
Costello, 350 U.S. at 363.
213
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. at 285; see also United States v. Amazon
Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931) (concluding that “none of the
reasons for [grand jury secrecy] are founded upon an inherent right in the
individual who is being investigated to the same constitutional safeguards that are
unquestionably his when he is brought to trial for a given crime”).
207
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B. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States: Acknowledging the
Role of Grand Jury Secrecy
Treating Costello as the final word on the rights encompassed by
the Grand Jury Clause stretches the Court’s holding too far. Though
Costello addressed the limited question of what the Grand Jury Clause
214
requires before a person may be subjected to trial, the Court’s
holding did not address whether the Grand Jury Clause contains
other requirements that must be satisfied to avoid dismissal of an
215
indictment. In Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, the Supreme
216
Court spoke to this critical distinction.
The defendants, Midland
Asphalt Corporation and Albert C. Litterer, moved to dismiss the
indictment against them on the grounds that the Government had
violated Rule 6(e) by disclosing matters occurring before the grand
217
The United States District Court for the Western District of
jury.
218
New York denied the motion. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the defendants’ appeal on the grounds that Rule 6(e)‘s
function is to “protect society’s interest in keeping secret the identity
219
of grand jury witnesses and persons under investigation.”
In
affirming the Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court stated,
“[t]here is a ‘crucial distinction between a right not to be tried and a
220
right whose remedy requires the dismissal of charges.’”
Consistent with Costello, the Court noted that “a right not to be
221
tried” exists “when there is no grand jury indictment.” The Court
went on to hold that “[o]nly a defect so fundamental that it causes
the grand jury no longer to be a grand jury, or the indictment no
longer to be an indictment, gives rise to the constitutional right not
222
to be tried.”
The “isolated breach of the traditional secrecy
requirements” by the Government was deemed insufficient to satisfy
223
Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling in
either of these requirements.
Midland Asphalt left open the possibility that violations of the secrecy
214

Costello, 350 U.S. at 363.
489 U.S. 794 (1989).
216
Id. at 800–02.
217
Id. at 796.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 797 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
220
Id. at 801 (quoting United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263,
269 (1982)).
221
Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 802.
222
Id. at 802.
223
Id.
215
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requirements incorporated into Rule 6(e) might provide the basis for
224
a reversal of a conviction on appeal.
Perhaps most importantly, the Court clarified the protections
afforded by the Grand Jury Clause, acknowledging that
“[u]ndoubtedly the common-law protections traditionally associated
with the grand jury attach to the grand jury required by this provision
[the Grand Jury Clause]—including the requisite secrecy of grand
225
jury proceedings.” Essentially, the Court indicated that defendants
have a Fifth Amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury that
226
functions under the traditional, common-law rules of secrecy.
Given that the Supreme Court has “consistently . . . recognized that
the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the
227
secrecy of grand jury proceedings,” such a rule would make sense.
C. Exploring the Interests Protected by Grand Jury Secrecy
Grasping the constitutional underpinnings of the right to
secrecy is impossible without first understanding the grand jury’s
function. The grand jury’s “establishment in the Constitution ‘as the
sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases’ indeed
228
‘shows the high place it [holds] as an instrument of justice.’”
In
recent years, the Supreme Court has stressed that the grand jury
serves “the ‘dual function of determining if there is probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens

224

Id. at 800. Additionally, the Court left open the possibility that in an extreme
circumstance, a violation of grand jury secrecy could give rise to the right not to be
tried. Id. at 802. Although the Court found that an “isolated breach of the
traditional secrecy requirements” did not give rise to such a right, id., the Court
failed to address whether a pattern of such breaches might do so. See id.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 802.
227
Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979);
accord Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 630 (1990).
228
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399–400 (1959)
(quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 359, 362 (1956)). In the words of
Justice Harlan:
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and
helpless—proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an
unreasoning public clamor—have found, and will continue to find,
security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the
machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons
who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their
personal enemies.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554–55 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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229

against unfounded criminal prosecutions.’”
“The . . . concern for
the grand jury’s dual function underlies the ‘long-established policy
that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the
230
federal courts.’”
The Supreme Court has recognized four distinct interests
231
protected by the right to secrecy in grand jury proceedings.
First,
“if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective
witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing
that those against whom they testify would be aware of that
232
testimony.” Second, “witnesses who appeared before the grand jury
would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open
233
to retribution as well as to inducements.”
Third, the risk would
exist “that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to
234
influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment.”
Fourth, “by preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that
persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be
235
held up to public ridicule.”
Clearly, not all of these interests implicate a defendant’s
236
constitutional rights. But the first two interests go to the very heart
of the grand jury function of shielding the innocent from
prosecution. The system cannot work without witnesses who “feel
237
free to speak the truth without reserve.”
The “cloak of silence”
covering grand jury proceedings was born in part of “the desire to
create a sanctuary, inviolate to any intrusion except on proof of some
special and overriding need, where a witness may testify, free and
229

United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423 (1983) (quoting Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686–87 (1972)) (emphasis added); see supra notes 13–19 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the grand jury’s historical purpose, which
recognized a dual function.
230
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 424 (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 681 (1958)); accord Costello, 350 U.S. at 362 (“The grand jury is an English
institution, brought to this country by the early colonists and incorporated in the
Constitution by the Founders.
There is every reason to believe that our
constitutional grand jury was intended to operate substantially like its English
progenitor.”). Traditionally, the English grand jury “act[ed] in secret.” Id.
231
Sells Eng’g, 463 U.S. at 424; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218.
232
Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
The third, for example, relates to the public’s interest in determining whether
probable cause exists to believe a crime has been committed.
237
Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1939).
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unfettered by fear of retaliation.”
It is not unreasonable to question why special protection of
grand jury witnesses is warranted. Today’s grand jury witness may be
tomorrow’s trial witness and, therefore, possibly subject to public
questioning. Of course, not every grand jury proceeding results in an
239
indictment and not every indictment results in a trial.
Likewise,
every trial does not require testimony from every grand jury witness.
In fact, it is far from certain that any given grand jury witness will ever
be asked to testify at trial.
More importantly, the difference in circumstances between an
appearance at trial and one before the grand jury may also justify
240
greater protection. Grand jury witnesses, who may be subjected to
intense questioning or even browbeating by prosecutors, appear
241
unprotected by counsel.
Prosecutors are allowed to “go fishing”
and seek evidence, such as hearsay, that would be inadmissible at
242
trial.
“Grand jury secrecy . . . ‘is as important for the protection of the
243
innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty.’” If potential but unknown
witnesses are concerned that their grand jury testimony will be not be
protected, they may remain in the shadows. If known witnesses fear
for their safety or that of friends or family, they may offer incomplete
244
or inaccurate testimony. Any time less than the whole story is told,
238

Texas v. U.S. Steel Corp., 546 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
For example, in fiscal year 1999 only six percent of all federal criminal
prosecutions were disposed of by trial. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 14 (2000).
240
Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 354 (1999) (“These circumstances might well combine to
make a grand jury witness more vulnerable to injury, and more deserving of
protection . . . .”).
241
Illinois v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 740 F.2d 533, 540 (7th Cir. 1984). A grand jury
witness does not have the right to have counsel present during questioning. In re
Petition of Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957). In essence, the scope of the
questioning is left to the prosecutor’s discretion. See id. at 333–34.
242
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361–64 (1956).
243
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983) (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943)). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4
F. Supp. 283, 284–85 (E.D. Pa. 1933) (“The rule of secrecy . . . was designed for the
protection of the witnesses who appear and for the purpose of allowing a wider and
freer scope to the grand jury itself, and was never intended as a safeguard for the
interests of the accused or of any third person.”).
244
Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979)
(recognizing that publicizing preindictment proceedings would both deter witnesses
from coming forward and inhibit witnesses who did appear from testifying “fully and
239
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245

an innocent person may stand accused.
The Grand Jury Clause
mandates a real grand jury with all of its protections, not a grand jury
in name only.
Like termites undermining the structure of a building, repeated
breaches of grand jury secrecy systemically injure the entire grand
jury process. Ultimately, the cumulative effect of disclosures denies
grand jury targets their Fifth Amendment right to a meaningful
review by the grand jury. Arguably, this is why courts and rulemakers
have been reluctant to recognize exceptions to the grand jury secrecy
246
rule and to grant disclosure pursuant to those exceptions.
If the
exceptions are permitted to swallow the rule, the entire grand jury
process suffers.
To illustrate, if the testimony of a grand jury witness in Case A is
disclosed, no injury may result to the target in Case A. Although the
disclosure may have no impact whatsoever on the proceedings
involving this particular target, it does not follow that the disclosure is
not harmful. Over time, after more and more disclosures, the public
247
becomes aware of the consequences, which has a chilling effect.
For example, fearing retribution of some sort, a witness in Case X fails
to step forward with information about the identity of the true
frankly”); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959)
(noting that “testimony would be parsimonious if each witness knew that his
testimony would soon be in the hands of the accused”).
245
In the words of Justice Harlan:
In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and
helpless—proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an
unreasoning public clamor—have found, and will continue to find,
security against official oppression, the cruelty of mobs, the
machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons
who would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their
personal enemies. “Grand juries perform,” says [Justice] Story, ‘most
important public functions, and are a great security to the citizens
against vindictive prosecutions, either by the government or by political
partisans, or by private enemies.’
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554–55 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
246
See generally supra Part I.
247
Though I am not suggesting that the right of grand jury secrecy is based on the
First Amendment, the threat of governmental action may function as a deterrent to
speech. To illustrate, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the threat of the
loss of a financial benefit, such as a job or a contract, “in retaliation for speech may
chill speech on matters of public concern.” Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518
U.S. 668, 674 (1996). The danger that grand jury witnesses’ testimony could be
disclosed to third parties who would harm them may deter witnesses from speaking
truthfully.
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perpetrator of the crime and another witness tells the grand jury less
than the whole story or, even worse, lies. As a result, the target in
Case X becomes the victim of a grand jury system weakened by
secrecy breaches.
D. Understanding the Dearth of Supreme Court Authority
The dearth of Supreme Court authority directly addressing the
existence of a constitutional right of grand jury secrecy can be
explained by the types of cases the Court has heard. Some cases
simply have not implicated secrecy interests relating to the
constitutional rights of defendants. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United
248
249
States and Dennis v. United States involved motions in which the
accused sought to obtain grand jury materials. Given that any
constitutional right to secrecy arises only from the Grand Jury Clause
and this clause creates rights belonging to the accused (not the
Government), these rights would not ordinarily come into play in a
250
In other cases, the
case in which the accused sought disclosure.
Court was able to reach a finding that disclosure was not permitted
251
under Rule 6(e).
Accordingly, there was no need to examine any
constitutional requirements.
In the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has ordered disclosure
pursuant to Rule 6(e) in only one case. In United States v. John Doe,
252
Inc. I, prior to filing a civil action, attorneys in the Justice
253
Department’s Antitrust Division needed to consult with the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and six
254
attorneys within the Civil Division. The Justice Department officials
248

360 U.S. 395 (1959).
384 U.S. 855 (1966).
250
Of course, even in the absence of any constitutional protection, the Court may,
in interpreting Rule 6(e), consider the “long-established policy of secrecy.” Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 360 U.S. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted).
251
See United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983) (holding that disclosure
of grand jury materials to IRS to allow it to determine tax liability was not permitted
under Rule 6(e)); Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 568 (1983) (finding
that disclosure of grand jury materials to state attorney general without court
approval and showing of particularized need would not comport with Rule 6(e)
requirements); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)
(concluding that defendants in civil antitrust action were not entitled to discovery of
grand jury transcript in Government’s possession).
252
481 U.S. 102 (1987).
253
The case involved a potential claim under the False Claims Act. Typically, the
Civil Division handled such claims. Id. at 105.
254
Id. at 104–05.
249
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requested permission to disclose grand jury materials. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that, because the Justice Department showed “a particularized need
for disclosure,” the requirements of then-Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) were
256
satisfied.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, finding the
257
disclosure “unnecessary,” reversed. After reviewing the record, the
Supreme Court concluded that the district court correctly applied
the “particularized need” standard and did not abuse its discretion in
258
allowing disclosure.
The John Doe case provided the Court with perhaps its best
opportunity to examine the relationship between the right of grand
jury secrecy and the right to a grand jury as created by the Grand Jury
Clause. Still, even this case did not require the Court to do so. The
259
case involved the application of former Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), which
260
required a court order to obtain discovery as well as “‘a strong
261
showing of particularized need’ before disclosure is permitted.”
Even if the Court were to have expressly recognized the
constitutional underpinnings of the right to secrecy, the test it
262
applied would have likely been the same. Indeed, in applying the
test, the Court specifically examined whether the disclosure would
263
seriously threaten the recognized secrecy interests.
Partly because the need has never arisen, the Supreme Court has
not yet directly addressed the constitutional underpinnings of the
doctrine of grand jury secrecy. The common-law and the preSeptember 11th version of Rule 6(e) provided safeguards equivalent
264
to those required under the Fifth Amendment.
If presented with
the question, the Supreme Court should rule that a material breach
of the traditional protection afforded grand jury secrecy is
unconstitutional.
To rule otherwise would strip the right to
indictment by a grand jury of much of its meaning.
255

Id.
Id.
257
Id. at 111.
258
John Doe, 481 U.S. at 116–17.
259
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) (2000) (amended 2001) (currently at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i)); see supra note 81.
260
John Doe, 481 U.S. at 111.
261
Id. at 112 (quoting United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443–45
(1983)).
262
See infra Part II.E.
263
John Doe, 481 U.S. at 113–15.
264
See infra text accompanying notes 269–80, 298–303.
256
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E. Examining the Parameters of Grand Jury Secrecy
Although the Supreme Court should recognize a Fifth
Amendment right of grand jury secrecy, that right should not be
265
absolute. The common-law protections attaching to the grand jury
as required by the Fifth Amendment have always allowed for
266
disclosure under certain circumstances. To determine the test for
the constitutionality of a disclosure, one must scrutinize these
protections, both as articulated by the courts and as codified in Rule
6(e). A review of the existing authorities indicates that for the
disclosure of grand jury materials to comport with the Fifth
Amendment, two criteria must be satisfied. First, a “compelling
267
necessity” for the disclosure must be established.
Second, barring
extraordinary circumstances, disclosure must be judicially
268
supervised.
1.

The Requirement of Compelling Necessity

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Procter & Gamble
269
Co. provides an excellent starting point for examining the commonlaw protections:
The grand jury as a public institution serving the community
might suffer if those testifying today knew that the secrecy of their
testimony would be lifted tomorrow. This “indispensable secrecy
of grand jury proceedings,” must not be broken except where
there is a compelling necessity. There are instances when that
need will outweigh the countervailing policy. But they must be

265

For example, see In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials Grand Jury No. 811, Miami, 833 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1987), where the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit stated:

[t]he policy of grand jury secrecy, whether viewed as a deeplyrooted tradition of the common law or as itself implicit in the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of indictment for “infamous crime,” is
nonetheless a generalized one. The balancing that must take place
is between the specific need of the Committee for material
necessary to its constitutionally empowered task of impeachment in
this case versus the specific secrecy interests that remain in these
grand jury materials.
Id. at 1443.
266
See supra notes 29–66 and accompanying text.
267
See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979);
see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
268
See supra notes 37–38, 42, 72 & 89 and accompanying text.
269
356 U.S. 677 (1958).
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270

Procter & Gamble holds that a person seeking disclosure of grand
jury materials bears the burden of establishing a “compelling
271
necessity” for the disclosure.
Such a requirement is entirely
consistent with the common law reflected in pre-September 11th
272
The analysis of whether a compelling necessity exists
Rule 6(e).
273
requires the application of a two-pronged test. Historically, matters
occurring before a federal grand jury have been subject to disclosure
274
in only a handful of circumstances: to serve the grand jury; to
275
protect defendants against prosecutorial misconduct; to further the
276
ends of justice in a judicial proceeding; and to assist state and
Indian tribal officials in the prosecution of state and Indian tribal
277
crimes. In each of these circumstances, disclosure may be required
to protect an important societal interest. Not every category of need
is sufficient to outweigh the policy of protecting grand jury
278
materials.
Thus, a person seeking disclosure must first establish
279
that his or her need is of the right kind.
But merely establishing
that a request falls within one of the recognized categories does not
270

Id. at 682 (citation omitted).
Id.
272
See discussion supra Part I.B.
273
See United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 480 (1983).
274
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) (allowing disclosure to “an attorney for the
government for use in performing that attorney’s duty” and to “any government
personnel . . . that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in
performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law”); FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(C) (“An attorney for the government may disclose any grand jury matter to
another federal grand jury.”); supra notes 53–65 and accompanying text.
275
For examples of courts denying disclosure requests from defendants before
grand juries see supra note 31 and cases cited therein. See also FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(E)(ii) (allowing disclosure when authorized by court “at the request of a
defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a
matter that occurred before the grand jury”).
276
See supra notes 32–33, 82–87 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(E)(i) (allowing disclosure when authorized by court “preliminarily to or in
connection with a judicial proceeding”).
277
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(iv) (allowing disclosure “at the request of the
government if it shows that the matter may disclose a violation of State, Indian tribal,
or foreign criminal law, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state, statesubdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official for the purpose of
enforcing that law”).
278
Baggot, 436 U.S. at 480 (holding that “not every beneficial purpose, or even
every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury
secrecy”).
279
Id.
271
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suffice to establish that disclosure is appropriate. A person seeking
disclosure must prove that he or she possesses a particularized need
280
for disclosure in the case at bar.
Principally, the courts have said that the need for the grand jury
materials must be real. “The particularized need test is a criterion of
281
For example, both private parties and governmental
degree . . . .”
282
officials seeking grand jury materials for use in another judicial
proceeding “must show the material they seek is needed to avoid a
possible injustice in [the] . . . judicial proceeding, that the need for
disclosure is greater than the need for secrecy, and that the request is
283
structured to cover only material so needed.” Satisfying this burden
is not easy. To overcome the need for secrecy, the party seeking
disclosure must establish that nondisclosure would result in great
284
prejudice.
Simply demonstrating that the grand jury materials
285
In determining whether
sought are “relevant” is insufficient.
disclosure is necessary, a court may weigh the likelihood that the
286
information could be obtained through other means.
Nonetheless, because it involves balancing interests, the
287
“particularized need” standard has always offered some elasticity.
By its very nature, the standard requires that the facts be considered
on a case-by-case basis. To illustrate, a “court might reasonably
consider that disclosure to Justice Department attorneys poses less
risk of further leakage . . . than would disclosure to private parties or
288
the general public.”
Additionally, “under the particularized need
standard, the district court may weigh the public interest, if any,
289
served by disclosure to a governmental body . . . .”
The sole exception to the requirement of a showing of
particularized need arises when a prosecutor seeks to disclose
information either to other government attorneys involved in federal
290
criminal investigations,
to government personnel assisting
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290

See supra notes 35–36, 82–87 and accompanying text.
Baggot, 463 U.S. at 480.
See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).
See id. at 221.
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 444 (1983).
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.
Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 567 n.15 (1983).
See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
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291

government attorneys in such investigations, or to federal grand
292
jurors. In the sense that it involves “revealing such information to
other persons,” sharing information with members of these groups
293
falls within the definition of disclosure.
Nevertheless, in this case,
sharing does not involve a revelation to a person not intimately
involved in the functioning of the grand jury. Two of the three
groups, government attorneys and grand jurors, have the right to be
294
present in the grand jury room.
The third group, government
personnel assisting government attorneys, is in some ways akin to a
group that has long had access to the grand jury room, court
295
stenographers. Like the stenographer, the FBI agent charged with
gathering evidence serves as the handmaid of the grand jury.
Furthermore, since persons within these groups may use the
information disclosed only for limited purposes, such as to further a
296
grand jury investigation, absent a belief that a need exists for their
assistance, there is no logical reason for a prosecutor to disclose the
information. In short, a particularized need must exist or there
would be no disclosure. The circumstances surrounding this
exception are truly unique.
A finding of compelling necessity is clearly required for
disclosure to comport with the requirements of the Grand Jury
297
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The question then becomes who
is responsible for making such a finding.
2.

The Need for Judicial Review

The decision to disclose grand jury materials has historically
298
been in the hands of the judiciary, rather than the prosecutor. To
understand why, one must consider the exceptional status of the
291

See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
293
United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 108 (1987).
294
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1).
295
Id.
296
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(B) (“A person to whom information is disclosed
under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney for the
government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law.”)
297
See supra notes 269–96 and accompanying text.
298
See supra notes 37, 42, 88–89 and accompanying text; see also Illinois v. Abbott &
Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 567 (1983) (“There is only one exception to the general
prohibition against disclosure without prior court approval, but that exception is
limited to Federal Government personnel performing a specified federal law
enforcement function.”).
292
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grand jury. “[T]he grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but
not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually
assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three
299
Articles. It “‘is a constitutional fixture in its own right.’”
Grand jury independence is fragile. It depends on a delicate
balance of judicial and prosecutorial oversight. “A grand jury is
clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains an
appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative
function without the court’s aid, because powerless itself to compel
300
the testimony of witnesses.” A grand jury cannot indict without the
301
consent of the prosecutor. Thus, if the grand jury is an appendage
of the court, it is also then an appendage of the prosecutor. The
Fifth Amendment’s “constitutional guarantee [of the right to
indictment by a grand jury] presupposes an investigative body ‘acting
302
It is
independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge . . . .’”
the fact that judge and prosecutor must share control that guarantees
the grand jury’s independence.
This requirement of judicial
involvement is entirely consistent with the common law reflected in
303
pre-September 11th Rule 6(e).
The function of the grand jury is to serve as a shield against
304
prosecutorial abuse, not as a prosecutor’s private tool. As Lord
305
Acton famously put it, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
The
involvement of the courts serves as a check on any abuse of power.
For example, acting under the auspices of a court, a prosecutor may
306
subpoena a witness or a record on the grand jury’s behalf.
Nonetheless, the court retains the right to “quash or modify a
subpoena on motion if compliance would be ‘unreasonable or
307
oppressive.’”
299

United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (intermediate citation omitted).
300
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled in part by Harris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
301
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813 F. Supp. 1451, 1461
(D. Colo. 1992).
302
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (quoting Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960)).
303
See supra Part I.B.
304
See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.
305
THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY 647 (E.D. Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed.
2002).
306
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
307
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 n.4 (1974) (quoting FED. R. CRIM.
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In the context of disclosures, it only makes sense that the courts
be given the power to decide when the veil of secrecy may be lifted.
308
Grand juries derive their subpoena power from the courts.
While
309
By design, grand juries may
broad, this power is not unlimited.
exercise this power to obtain evidence relating to whether there is
310
probable cause that a crime has been committed.
They may not
311
exercise this power for other purposes. “In short, if grand juries are
to be granted extraordinary powers of investigation because of the
difficulty and importance of their task, the use of those powers ought
to be limited as far as reasonably possible to the accomplishment of
312
the task.” When information obtained via a grand jury subpoena is
sought for a purpose other than that for which it was intended (i.e.,
when disclosure is sought), the ultimate source of the subpoena
power, the court, should be the final arbiter. Otherwise, the grand
jury becomes the prosecutor’s tool and the potential for misuse is
313
substantial.
The court is also the body best suited to undertake the balancing
of interests required to determine whether disclosure is warranted.
“A court of law . . . is the sole means of protecting individual privacy
from the airing of private judgment unguided by standards of due
314
process.” If decision making were left in the hands of prosecutors,
there would be no hearing, no presentation of evidence, no record,
no guiding precedent, and no possibility of appeal.
Most
importantly, there would be no neutral decision maker. Weighing
the various interests involved when disclosure of grand jury materials
315
is at issue is a delicate task. Accordingly, the decision to remove the
veil of grand jury secrecy should not be made on an ad hoc basis.
Again, the sole exception to the requirement that disclosure be
subject to judicial approval arises when a prosecutor seeks to disclose
information to other government attorneys involved in federal
criminal investigations, government personnel assisting government
P. 17(c)).
308
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled in part by Harris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
309
United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991).
310
Id. at 297.
311
See, e.g., id. at 299.
312
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 434–35 (1983).
313
Id. at 432–33.
314
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Special Grand Jury 89-2, 813 F. Supp. 1451, 1458
(D. Colo. 1992).
315
Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940).
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attorneys in such investigations, or federal grand jurors.
As
discussed above, the circumstances giving rise to this exception are
317
unique. A prosecutor is the best judge of the amount and type of
investigative support needed to conduct a grand jury investigation.
Additionally, “interlocutory appeal of issues disruptive of a grand jury
318
investigation are not favored.” The sheer number of such requests
would be likely to overwhelm the system. Based on the foregoing, to
comport with the Fifth Amendment right of grand jury secrecy, the
disclosure of grand jury materials must be the result of a compelling
necessity and must be judicially approved.
III. RULE 6(E), THE CONSTITUTION, AND SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
The exceptions to the doctrine of grand jury secrecy created by
the Patriot Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act fundamentally differ from the traditional
319
exceptions.
Congress, reacting viscerally to catastrophic events,
enacted these permanent additions to the legal landscape in haste
and buried them deep within cumbersome bills. The 340-plus-page
Patriot Act was conceived, written, and enacted within six weeks of
320
the attacks of September 11th.
Few legislators voiced dissent,
321
perhaps out of fear for being labeled unpatriotic.
The typical
committee hearings and debates surrounding legislation of this scope
322
(or any scope for that matter) were absent.
Rarely do passionate
316

See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 290–96.
318
S. REP. NO. 95-354, at 7 n.12 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531; cf.
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (“The duration of its (the
grand jury’s) life, frequently short, is limited by statute. It is no less important to
safeguard against undue interruption the inquiry instituted by a grand jury than to
protect from delay the progress of the trial after an indictment has been found.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
319
See supra notes 97–135, 172–80 and accompanying text.
320
The Patriot Act was introduced to the Senate on October 4, 2001, S. 1510,
107th Cong. (2001), 147 CONG. REC. S10,285 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2001), and signed into
law by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, as Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
321
The House passed the measure by a vote of 357 to 66, and the Senate passed it
by a vote of 98 to 1. Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1177–78 (2004).
322
See generally Emmanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights
in the United States: The Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
1, 3 (2002) (“Congress took action without a proper debate on the Patriot Act’s
ramifications and without providing the American public with an opportunity to
voice its opinion, despite the enormous impact of the Patriot Act on the daily lives of
317
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323

reactions produce good law.
If Congress intends to permanently
alter the grand jury system that is older than our nation itself, it
should do so thoughtfully and with great care.
During times of turmoil, the rights enshrined in our
324
Constitution face their greatest threat.
“In such periods the times
seem so different, so out of joint, the threats from within or without
seem so unprecedented, that the Constitution itself is perceived by
many persons as anachronistic, or at least rigidly, unrealistically
325
Congress must be ever aware of the dangers of
formalistic.”
allowing momentary fears to drive public policy.
With this danger in mind, Congress should take the opportunity
to review and repair any damage inflicted by the recent amendments,
and should examine the Patriot intelligence exception and the
terrorism prevention exception under the lens of the Constitution
and with an eye to sound public policy.
A. The Patriot Intelligence Exception
A careful study of the Patriot intelligence exception reveals that
its application results in disclosures causing systemic injury to the
grand jury process. As written and applied, the exception violates the
all American citizens.”).
323
One need only ponder the internment and exclusion of Japanese-Americans
during World War II to grasp the sometimes unthinkable misjudgments of leaders
and citizens alike in wartime. See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). Almost half a century later, Congress specifically recognized that:
as described by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, a grave injustice was done to both citizens and
permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation,
relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II. As the
Commission documents, these actions were carried out without
adequate security reasons and without any acts of espionage or
sabotage documented by the Commission, and were motivated largely
by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political
leadership. The excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry suffered
enormous damages, both material and intangible, and there were
incalculable losses in education and job training, all of which resulted
in significant human suffering for which appropriate compensation has
not been made. For these fundamental violations of the basic civil
liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese
ancestry, the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation.
Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts, Pub. L.
No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2000)).
324
See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449, 456–57 (1985).
325
Id.
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Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Even if the
constitutional problems are ignored, sound public policy reasons
327
exist for reworking this exception.
1.

The Fifth Amendment Analysis

To satisfy the Fifth Amendment, any disclosure must be justified
328
by a compelling necessity and must be judicially supervised.
The
Patriot intelligence exception sanctions disclosures that satisfy
neither criterion. The exception permits a prosecutor to disclose
“any grand jury matter involving foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence . . . or foreign intelligence information . . . to
any federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration,
national defense, or national security official to assist the official
receiving the information in the performance of that official’s
329
duties.”
Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure
330
sought must be of a kind that serves an important societal interest.
Additionally, the need for disclosure must be shown with
331
particularity.
Undoubtedly, the Patriot intelligence exception
satisfies the first prong of this test. Disclosure for purposes of
promoting national security has never been included among the
recognized categories of disclosure. Society’s interest in protecting
itself against hostile acts, such as terrorism and sabotage, however,
can hardly be less significant than its interest in the enforcement of
public or private rights in a civil action, a long-recognized category of
332
disclosure. Few would argue that if grand jury testimony uncovers a
legitimate threat to national security, it should not be revealed to the
proper authorities.
The Patriot intelligence exception, however, fails to satisfy the
second prong of the test. Notably, the exception does not require
persons seeking disclosure to show a particularized need. Adopting
the broadest possible terms, under this exception, disclosure is not
limited to instances in which the United States is faced with some sort
326

See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
328
See supra Part II.E.
329
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D); see also supra notes 97–135 and accompanying text
(discussing amending Rule 6(e)).
330
See supra text accompanying notes 269–97.
331
See supra text accompanying notes 280–96.
332
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 283–85 (E.D. Pa. 1933).
327
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333

of threat, immediate or otherwise.
To illustrate, under the
definition of “foreign intelligence” incorporated into the
334
exception, a prosecutor would be permitted to report a foreign
335
student’s membership in a particular mosque to the FBI or the CIA.
Alarmingly, the exception does not require any evidence of
336
wrongdoing. Regardless of whether federal officials have a need for
the information, if you happen to be a non-United States citizen, any
of your activities may be reported.
It is not simply the language of the Patriot intelligence exception
that is troubling. None of the pre-September 11th exceptions in
337
Rule 6(e) expressly require a showing of particularized need.
But
the more troubling aspect of this exception is the manner in which it
has been interpreted. The interpretation of this exception by the
Department of Justice as reflected in the information-sharing
guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General supports the idea
338
that a showing of “particularized need” is not required. In fact, the
339
guidelines make disclosure mandatory.
If information falls within
340
the categories described in Rule 6(e), it “shall be shared.”
In the
long history of the doctrine of grand jury secrecy, no exception has
ever been used to mandate disclosure.
The vast number of disclosures mandated by the guidelines is
341
unprecedented. To illustrate, as discussed above, the broad
definition of “foreign intelligence” covers every act by a foreign
citizen, here or abroad. If the mandate provided by the guidelines is
to be followed to the letter, a prosecutor would be charged with
reporting a noncitizen’s trip to the grocery store for milk and bread.
342
As directed by Congress, the Justice Department is creating a
333

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
Id.
335
The term “foreign intelligence” includes “information relating to the . . .
activities of . . . foreign persons,” 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2) (2000 & Supp. I 2001); see supra
note 100 and accompanying text. A foreign student’s act of joining a mosque could
be an “activity” of a “foreign person.”
336
See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(2).
337
See supra Part I.B.
338
See supra notes 116–24 and accompanying text.
339
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2; see also supra notes
118–23, 131–35 and accompanying text.
340
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 5, at 3 (emphasis added).
341
See supra notes 100 & 335 and accompanying text.
342
Congress is so concerned about foreign intelligence information being
overlooked that it has mandated that the Department of Justice create a training
program that helps law enforcement officials identify foreign intelligence materials
334
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training program to help prosecutors and other law enforcement
343
There is no
officials identify foreign intelligence information.
reason to believe, however, that the Department will ignore the
language of Rule 6 and the guidelines and instruct prosecutors to
more narrowly define this term.
The guidelines permit a prosecutor to petition the Attorney
344
General for an exemption.
The focus, however, appears to be on
protecting criminal investigations, not on balancing the various
345
interests involved.
No one seems to be watching out for the
346
interests of grand jury targets. A presumption of disclosure exists.
Accordingly, as interpreted by the Attorney General, the Patriot
intelligence exception not only permits disclosure without a showing
of compelling need, it endorses such disclosure.
The Patriot intelligence exception also fails to satisfy the
347
criterion that any disclosure be judicially supervised. The decision
to disclose is completely in the hands of the Justice Department.
Indeed, while the government must reveal the entity to which any
information was disclosed to the court under whose authority the
grand jury evidence was gathered, it need not identify the specific
348
persons to whom the information was disclosed.
The exception
contains no mechanism for preventing its misuse.
The Patriot intelligence exception creates a material breach of
the protection afforded grand jury secrecy by the Fifth Amendment.
The failure to require a showing of particularized need and the
that must be shared. Patriot Act § 908, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. at 391 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 509 note (Supp. I 2001)).
343
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117 Guideline 3, at 2.
344
Id. Guideline 5(c), at 4.
345
Id. Guidelines 8(b) & 9, at 5–6. The guidelines do not adequately address
when an exemption is proper. Guideline 9(b) indicates that until such time as the
Attorney General creates permanent exemptions from the disclosure obligation,
requests will be handled by the Attorney General on a “case-by-case” basis. Id.
Guideline 9(b), at 5. No guidance as to the criteria to be considered is provided.
Guideline 9(c), however, requires a written request for exemption that among other
things explains “why lesser measures such as use restrictions are not adequate.” Id.
Guideline 9(c), at 6. Thus, exemptions will be considered using the same criteria as
requests for use restrictions. Guideline 8(b) allows use restrictions when necessary
“to protect sensitive law enforcement sources and ongoing criminal investigations
and prosecutions.” Id. Guideline 8(b), at 5.
346
See id. Guideline 9(c), at 6.
347
See discussion supra Part II.E.2.
348
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(ii). Paragraph 5 of the notice examplar
provided by the Department of Justice to Congress illustrates how vague the notice
provided to the court can be. See supra note 155.
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failure to require judicial supervision create a situation in which
349
enormous numbers of disclosures can, have, and will be made. The
cumulative effect of these disclosures will be to chill the participation
of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause systemic injury to the
350
grand jury process.
2.

The Public Policy Analysis

Setting aside its constitutionality, public policy reasons strongly
support amending the Patriot intelligence exception. The collective
wisdom of nearly a millennium has been that secrecy is
351
“indispensable” to grand jury proceedings.
“[W]hen disclosure is
352
permitted, it is to be done ‘discretely and limitedly.’”
The Patriot
intelligence exception permits disclosure that is hardly discrete and
353
far from limited. This exception permits so many disclosures that it
threatens to swallow the rule of secrecy. Upon closer examination,
Congress will recognize that national security objectives could be met
without drastically altering the grand jury system.
There can be little doubt that under some circumstances,
society’s interest in national security outweighs society’s need for
grand jury secrecy. But this is not always the case. Every piece of
information that falls within the broad definitions of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence information is not vital (or even
relevant) to national security. The Patriot intelligence exception
lacks a reasonable mechanism for separating the wheat from the
chafe.
The most troubling aspect of this exception is the complete
354
absence of judicial supervision.
First, it is more likely that
intelligence information obtained in the course of ordinary grand
jury investigations will be disclosed. Quite simply, no one is in a
position to deny disclosure based on lack of relevancy or need. In
fact, the Attorney General’s guidelines in effect prohibit anyone from

349

See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 236–47 and accompanying text.
351
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (quoting
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943)); see also supra notes 9–28 and
accompanying text, 39–46 and accompanying text, and Part II.C.
352
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869 (1966) (quoting Procter & Gamble,
356 U.S. at 683).
353
See supra text accompanying notes 103–11, 334, 341–43.
354
See supra text accompanying notes 99, 104–13, 347–50.
350
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denying disclosure based on such considerations.
Second, the lack of judicial supervision creates the temptation
on the part of the Justice Department to abuse the grand jury
356
system.
Instead of using the grand jury’s powers to determine
whether there is probable cause that a crime occurred, prosecutors
could wield the grand jury as an intelligence-gathering tool.
Pursuant to the information-sharing guidelines, the CIA
357
Director has a direct role in the disclosure process. The guidelines
thus foster an unhealthy entanglement between the Justice
Department and the CIA. The Director is charged with helping the
Attorney General establish any formalized exceptions to the rule of
358
disclosure, assisting in the design of a training curriculum which
will allow law enforcement officials to identify intelligence
359
information, and consulting with the Attorney General on decisions
360
relating to whether to exempt specific materials from disclosure.
Further, Guideline 6 permits recipients of information to request
361
“additional information,” “clarification,” or “amplification.”
If a
prosecutor knows that the CIA wishes to obtain additional facts on a
matter unrelated to the grand jury’s criminal investigation, directing
362
questions on that matter to a witness would be all too easy.
Information sharing between federal law enforcement agencies
and intelligence agencies may well be necessary to national security,
but such sharing could be fostered without the excessive
entanglement created by the Patriot intelligence exception. The
decision as to whether or not to disclose grand jury materials could
be made by a truly neutral decisionmaker, who could balance the
interests of all involved; namely, a judge. The dangers these
355

See Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2.
Jennifer M. Collins, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury
Information with the Intelligence Community Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1261, 1276 (2002).
357
With the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, this role will likely be assumed by the Director of National Intelligence. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(i) (indicating the guidelines are to be promulgated by
the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence). As of the writing of
this Article, however, the guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General and the
Dircteor of the Central Intelligence Agency remain in force.
358
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 2, at 2.
359
Id. Guideline 5(c), at 4.
360
Id. Guideline 9(b), at 5.
361
Id. Guideline 6(b), at 4.
362
Collins, supra note 356, at 1276. This is especially true since the CIA itself lacks
subpoena power. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1) (2000).
356
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entanglements pose to our civil rights are well documented. Even
though several justifications for lack of judicial supervision have been
364
put forth, by simply requiring judicial supervision, this slippery
slope could be avoided altogether.
Members of the Bush Administration provided initial
365
The House Judiciary Committee approved a version
justifications.
of the Patriot intelligence exception that required judicial
366
supervision. It would have allowed disclosure:
when permitted by a court at the request of an attorney for the
government, upon a showing that the matters pertain to
international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of
title 18, United States Code) or national security, to any Federal
law enforcement, intelligence, national security, national defense,
protective, immigration personnel, or to the President or Vice
President of the United States, for the performance of official
367
duties.

Some senators strongly advocated for judicial supervision.
Senator Patrick Leahy, for example, argued that judicial oversight of
disclosure of both wiretap information and grand jury materials to
368
intelligence officials was warranted.
On September 30, 2001, the
Administration agreed to judicial oversight, but within two days it
369
reneged. According to Senator Leahy,
[t]he Administration offered three reasons for reneging on the
original deal. First, they claimed that the involvement of the court
would inhibit Federal investigators and attorneys from disclosing
information needed by intelligence and national security officials.
Second, they said the courts might not have adequate security and
therefore should not be told that information was disclosed for
intelligence or national security purposes. And third, they said the
President’s constitutional powers under Article II give him
authority to get whatever foreign intelligence he needs to exercise

363

Collins, supra note 356, at 1277 (describing massive abuse of federal law
enforcement powers during Cold War).
364
See infra notes 365–70 and accompanying text.
365
See 147 CONG. REC. S10,555–56 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
366
H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, § 353 (2001).
367
Id. (emphasis added).
368
147 CONG. REC. S10,555–56 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
369
Id.
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370

The first argument, that judicial supervision would somehow
inhibit the disclosure of needed information, is specious.
If
intelligence and national security officials truly “need” information,
there is no reason to believe that a federal judge would refuse to
authorize its disclosure. To illustrate, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, which approves electronic surveillance and
physical searches for intelligence purposes pursuant to the Foreign
371
372
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, has rarely refused a request.
370

Id. at S10,556. Sen. Leahy provided this explanation when discussing the
Administration’s reasons for reneging on its agreement to permit judicial supervision
of the disclosure of wiretap information. Id. at S10,555–56. Presumably, the
Administration went back on its agreement to permit judicial supervision of the
disclosure of grand jury information for the same reasons.
371
50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822 (2000).
372
In 1999,
886 applications were made for orders and extensions of orders
approving electronic surveillance or physical search under the Act.
[T]he United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued
orders in 880 applications granting authority to the Government for
the requested electronic surveillance and electronic searches. . . . Five
applications which were filed in late December 1999 were approved
when presented to the Court on January 5, 2000. No orders were
entered which modified or denied the requested authority.
Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to the Honorable J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 27, 2000).
In 2000,
1005 applications were made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court for electronic surveillance and physical search. The Court
approved 1003 of these applications in 2000. Two of the 1005
applications were filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
in December 2000 and approved in January 2001. . . . No orders were
entered which denied the requested authority.
Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham, Director,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 27, 2001).
In 2001,
932 applications were made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court for electronic surveillance and physical search. The Court
approved 934 applications in 2001. Two of the 934 applications were
filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in December
2000 and approved in January 2001. Two orders and two warrants were
modified by the Court. No orders were entered which denied the
requested authority.
Letter from Larry D. Thompson, Acting Attorney General, to L. Ralph Mecham,
Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29, 2002).
“[A]ll 1228 applications presented to the Foreign Intelligen[c]e Surveillance
Court in 2002 were approved.” Letter from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to L.
Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 29,
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The executive branch’s apparent distrust of the judiciary is alarming.
The Bush Administration may also have been distrustful of the
prosecutors themselves, fearing that prosecutors would be unwilling
to expend the effort needed to obtain court approval. After taking
part in the Congressional Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001, a joint inquiry of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator
Richard Shelby concluded that the Patriot intelligence exception was
enacted because the Justice Department used Rule 6(e) as an excuse
373
to avoid sharing information with the intelligence community. The
Justice Department claimed Rule 6(e) protection for non-grand jury
374
materials.
[W]orking from the assumption that it would be easier to change
the law itself than to fix a parochial and dysfunctional
institutional culture that used the Rule as an excuse to prevent all
information-sharing, [Attorney General Ashcroft and Congress]
determined simply to change Rule 6(e) to permit information375
sharing with intelligence officials.

Indeed, the law now requires law enforcement officials to share
376
information.
The fact that prosecutors may have misapplied Rule
6(e) protections in the past does not justify a wholesale change in the
rule or, more to the point, elimination of judicial oversight. If the
institutional culture within the Justice Department is dysfunctional, it
must be changed from within.
2003).
373
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SEN. RICHARD C. SHELBY, VICE-CHAIRMAN, SEN. SELECT
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPERATIVE OF REFORM IN THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 58, S. REP. NO. 107-351 (2002).
Rule 6(e) increasingly came to be used simply as an excuse for not
sharing information—leaving vital collections of shareable information
about international terrorist groups off-limits to IC intelligence
analysts. For years, it was routine FBI and DOJ practice to respond to
virtually any Intelligence Community requests for information with the
answer that “Rule 6(e)” prevented any response. As two frustrated NSC
veterans describe it, “Rule 6E [sic] is much more than a procedural
matter: it is the bulwark of an institutional culture, and as Justice
Department lawyers readily admit, it is used by the Bureau far more
often than it should be. It is one of the Bureau’s foremost tools for
maintaining the independence that the FBI views as its birthright.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
374
Id.
375
Id. at 59.
376
Id.

556

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:495

The second argument (that the courts lack adequate security to
be entrusted with sensitive information) is equally unsound. First,
the courts certainly have the benefit of as much security as many of
the federal agencies and departments that will be the recipients of
information disclosed under the Patriot intelligence exception. A
federal court poses no greater security risk than does the Social
Security Administration. Second, the problem of security could easily
be overcome by creating a court akin to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court established under the Foreign Intelligence
377
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). For example, the chief judge for
each district could appoint a judge to hear all requests under the
Patriot intelligence exception. That judge could receive special
training and employ heightened security measures. Appeals could be
made to a specialized court of review appointed by the Chief Justice.
Finally, the third argument (that the President could employ
powers under Article II to compel disclosure) begs the question of
whether he should do so. That the President has an absolute right to
go through grand jury materials is doubtful at best—no president has
ever exercised such a power. Even assuming this power exists,
exercising it in the indiscriminate manner permitted, and even
mandated, under the Patriot intelligence exception would be
foolhardy. “In fact the whole theory of [the grand jury’s] function is
that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving
as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the
378
people.”
The President should and must trust that the courts will
379
recognize his needs.
The Justice Department hinted at another justification in its
response to questions from the House of Representatives’ Committee
on the Judiciary.
In explaining how the Patriot intelligence
exception aids in the information-sharing process, the Justice
Department noted the “practical difficulties” involved in utilizing the
380
traditional exceptions.
For example, in discussing the problems
involved with using the law enforcement exception, the Justice
377

See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court consists of eleven district court judges selected by the Chief
Justice. Id. § 1803(a). The court is conducted in secret in Washington, D.C., with
the judges presiding on a rotating basis. Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA
Court: from Watchdog to Lapdog?, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 250, 252 (2002).
378
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
379
147 CONG. REC. S10,556 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
380
See Bryant Letter (Sept. 20, 2002), supra note 137, at 1.
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Department pointed out that the exception requires a government
attorney to provide the court with the name of each individual
381
receiving information under the exception. “In the context of the
9/11 investigations and other terrorism investigations that are
national and international in scope and may involve literally
thousands of investigators and dozens of grand juries, this
requirement was onerous and a diversion of resources from
382
If the Justice Department views merely
investigative activity.”
reporting information to a court as “onerous,” it likely views
obtaining approval for disclosure as extraordinarily burdensome.
Undeniably, permitting disclosure without court approval is more
cost-effective. The Supreme Court, however, has never viewed cost
383
savings as a valid reason for lifting the veil of grand jury secrecy. If
the Justice Department requires additional clerical or other help, the
American taxpayers should be forced to bear that cost.
Any “practical difficulties” resulting from the time required to
obtain court approval could easily be addressed in the text of the
rule. The Attorney General’s information-sharing guidelines already
distinguish between the treatment of materials relating to “a potential
384
385
terrorism or Weapons of Mass Destruction threat” and the
treatment of other grand jury materials subject to disclosure under
the Patriot intelligence exception by permitting a forty-eight hour

381

Id.
Id.
383
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 431 (1983) (concluding that
while it would be “of substantial help to a Justice Department Civil attorney if he had
free access to a storehouse of evidence compiled by a grand jury[,]” this type of cost
savings could not justify a breach of grand jury secrecy).
384
“Terrorism Information” is defined as:
All information relating to the existence, organization, capabilities,
plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support,
or activities of foreign or international terrorist groups or individuals
or threats posed by such groups or individuals to the United States,
United States persons, or United States interests, or to those of other
nations, or to communications between such groups or individuals, or
information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be
assisting or associated with them.
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, Guideline 5(a)(i), at 3.
385
“Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Information” is defined as “All
information relating to conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional
weapons capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear agents and weapons and the means of delivery of
such weapons.” Id. Guideline 5(a)(ii).
382
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386

delay in the disclosure of the latter.
When an immediate threat
exists to national security, prosecutors could be permitted to disclose
without judicial approval. In contrast, when time is not of the
essence, a fast-track judicial approval procedure is more appropriate.
Accordingly, no valid justification exists for the absence of judicial
supervision. Congress could easily amend Rule 6(e) to protect
important national security interests without destroying the secrecy
that is so essential to grand jury proceedings.
B. The Terrorism Prevention Exception
The terrorism prevention exception raises the same
constitutional issues as the Patriot intelligence exception. As written,
the terrorism prevention exception would violate the Grand Jury
387
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Again, even if the constitutional
issues are ignored, sound public policy reasons exist for redrafting
388
this exception.
1.

The Fifth Amendment Analysis

To satisfy Fifth Amendment requirements, any disclosure of
grand jury materials must be justified by a compelling necessity and
389
be judicially supervised.
The terrorism prevention exception
authorizes disclosures that satisfy neither criterion. This exception
permits disclosure without judicial approval of
any grand jury matter involving, within the United States or
elsewhere, a threat of attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power or its agent, a threat of domestic or international
sabotage or terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power
or by its agent, to any appropriate Federal, State, State
subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government official, for the
390
purpose of preventing or responding to such threat or activities.

Under the two-pronged compelling necessity test, the disclosure
391
sought must be of a kind that serves an important societal interest,
392
and the need for disclosure must be shown with particularity.
386
387
388
389
390
391
392

See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See supra Part II.E.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D).
See supra notes 273–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 280–96 and accompanying text.
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Undoubtedly, the terrorism prevention exception satisfies the first
prong of this test. This exception is more narrowly drawn than the
Patriot intelligence exception in one important respect—the Patriot
intelligence exception permits the disclosure of information that
393
does not relate to a direct threat of some type to the United States.
394
As discussed above, “foreign intelligence” could involve virtually any
act by a noncitizen. In contrast, the terrorism prevention exception
for the most part focuses on activities, such as attack, sabotage, and
395
terrorism, that involve a direct threat to public safety.
Preventing
such activities unquestionably serves a long-recognized societal
396
interest.
However, the terrorism prevention exception fails to satisfy the
second prong of the test, for it permits disclosure without a showing
of particularized need. Not every situation encompassed within the
exception’s broad terms involves a real threat to public safety. For
instance, many actions could be disclosed under the undefined threat
397
of “terrorism.”
Naturally, the county sheriff needs to know that
there are plans afoot to place a bomb in the county courthouse. On
the other hand, the county sheriff may not need to know that there
are plans afoot for a peaceful protest within the courthouse. This
exception could easily become a tool used against those who might
voice public dissent.
Moreover, the exception permits disclosure to a wide range of
officials, from the President of the United States to the mayor of a
398
village in the middle of Tibet. The vital question of which officials
possess a genuine need to know about a particular “threat” is far from
clear. As written, the terrorism prevention exception permits
disclosure when no compelling need exists.
Since the exception only became effective in December 2004 it is
399
difficult to predict how it will be applied.
Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(i)
393

See supra text accompanying notes 97–103.
See supra notes 100 & 334–35 and accompanying text.
395
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
396
Indeed, there have been rare occasions in our history when the Supreme
Court was willing to sacrifice fundamental individual liberties on the altar of national
security. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding
wartime exclusion order by commanding general of Western Command, U.S. Army,
“which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be
excluded from [San Leandro, California, a military area]”).
397
See supra text accompanying notes 181–84.
398
See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text.
399
The Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of Central Intelligence
394
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indicates that the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence will jointly issue guidelines governing the use of grand
jury materials by state, foreign, and local officials pursuant to the
Patriot intelligence and terrorism prevention exceptions. This part
of the rule, nevertheless, does not require the issuance of any
guidelines governing the disclosure of such information. Still, there
is no reason to believe that the Attorney General will not follow the
precedent set in the interpretation of the Patriot intelligence
exception by making disclosure mandatory.
The terrorism prevention exception also fails to satisfy the
400
criterion that any disclosure be judicially supervised. The language
of the exception permits prosecutors to act unilaterally. If a
substantial threat is imminent, the government’s interest in
protecting national security may outweigh any right to grand jury
secrecy. In that case, unilateral action may be constitutionally
permissible. The language of the exception, however, permits
unilateral action even in the absence of an imminent threat. Despite
a lack of purpose, the exception excludes judicial participation in the
decision-making process. As with the Patriot intelligence exception,
the court is provided with nothing more than a vague, after-the-fact
notice that “information” was disclosed to a particular department,
401
agency, or entity. No meaningful role exists for the judiciary in this
402
process.
The establishment of the terrorism prevention exception sets
the stage for a material breach of the protection afforded grand jury
secrecy by the Fifth Amendment. Congress’ failure to require a
showing of particularized need and to provide a meaningful role for
the courts means that vast numbers of disclosures can and will be
made. Again, the cumulative effect of these disclosures will be to
chill the participation of grand jury witnesses, and thereby cause
403
systemic injury to the grand jury process.

and Homeland Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence Acquired in the Course of a
Criminal Investigation released by Attorney General Ashcroft on Sept. 23, 2002,
apply to information sharing under section 905(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Ashcroft Memorandum I, supra note 117, at 1. Thus, under the terrorism prevention
exception, these Guidelines do not apply to disclosures.
400
See supra Part II.E.2.
401
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(D)(ii); supra note 200 and accompanying text.
402
See supra text accompanying notes 199–202.
403
See generally supra notes 236–47 and accompanying text.
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The Public Policy Analysis

Even assuming that the terrorism prevention exception poses no
constitutional problems, strong public policy arguments support its
amendment. In creating this exception, Congress took measures far
beyond those necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of preventing
and responding to threats to our national security. Unnecessarily,
404
Congress sacrificed the “public interest” in secrecy.
Judicious
amendment of the terrorism prevention exception could protect the
doctrine of grand jury secrecy while furthering the goal of preventing
and responding to national security threats.
Few would disagree with Congress that, in some form, a
terrorism prevention exception should exist—if information
regarding a true threat to national security becomes known during a
grand jury session, it should be disclosed to the proper authorities.
405
Grand jury materials have been disclosed for lesser reasons. But in
drafting the terrorism prevention exception, Congress made some
critical mistakes. First, it failed to set needed parameters in terms of
the types of information that could be disclosed under the exception.
406
Failing to define terms such as “terrorism” denies those seeking to
apply the exception much-needed guidance and opens the doors to
abuse. It allows the disclosure of activities that do not pose any threat
to national security.
Second, Congress again created a system that places no checks
on the executive branch’s power. The judiciary lacks the ability to
identify, much less prevent or punish any abuses of this exception.
Further, “[s]ince the Department of Justice has taken the position
that the intelligence committees of Congress should not be permitted
to see any grand jury information, this means that there is no
oversight of what use is made of grand jury material passed to the
407
Intelligence Community.”
Ironically, the same information that is

404

Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218–23 (1979);
see also supra notes 9–28 and accompanying text, 39–46 and accompanying text, and
Part II.C.
405
For instance, where a particularized need is established, grand jury materials
may be disclosed for use in other civil and criminal proceedings. FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3)(E)(i).
406
See supra notes 182–84, 397 and accompanying text.
407
SHELBY, S. REP. 107-351, supra note 373, at 60 n.123. “The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence tried to provide for such oversight in its FY03
th
authorization bill, see S.2506 (107 Cong., 2d Sess.), at § 306, but this provision was
removed in conference at the insistence of the Administration.” Id.
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entrusted to a foreign official may not be shared with the judicial or
legislative branches of our own government.
Certainly, some situations exist in which it would be
impracticable to require prosecutors to seek judicial approval. Of
course, if a substantial and imminent threat exists a prosecutor may
need to shout what he knows from the rooftops. The law, naturally,
should permit such disclosures. But not every situation requires
immediate disclosure. Indeed, some situations do not require any
disclosure. At a minimum, prosecutors should be required to provide
408
a list of those receiving information to the court.
Prosecutors and judges can and should work hand-in-hand to
determine when the public’s interest in national security outweighs
its interest in grand jury secrecy. The prosecutor should identify
information that may evidence a threat and immediately bring that
information to the court’s attention. The court should quickly weigh
all of the competing interests and determine whether disclosure is
warranted and the conditions under which it should be made.
Weighing the interests involved benefits all concerned. Grand jury
targets are not the only parties who have a strong interest in a grand
409
jury system that protects against unwarranted disclosures. Both the
public and the government have an interest in maintaining a system
in which grand jury witnesses freely step forward and testify “fully and
frankly,” and in which targets are not given the opportunity to flee or
410
intimidate witnesses or jurors. Secrecy is necessary to the discovery
of the truth.
While the Bush Administration has fought hard to create the
new exceptions to the rule of secrecy, it too apparently recognizes the
value of secrecy. In early 2003, the Administration reportedly floated
legislation that would amend Rule 6(e) yet again to tighten the rule
411
of secrecy. Section 206 of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act
of 2003 would have, in certain circumstances, required secrecy with
412
respect to grand jury witnesses. Although, for the time being, this
408

See supra notes 381–83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 236–47 and accompanying text; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218
(finding that “the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings”).
410
Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219.
411
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, “PATRIOT ACT II”, at
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/PA2draft.html#Sec206summ (draft Jan. 9,
2003).
412
Id.
Specifically, the description of section 206, entitled “Grand Jury
Information in Terrorism Cases” states:
409
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413

proposal now appears to have been dropped, it evidences the vital
role of secrecy in the grand jury system.
Another person with a substantial interest in maintaining grand
jury secrecy is the grand jury witness. Under the terrorism prevention
exception as written, no one protects the interests of the witness. No
one is charged with considering whether disclosing a witness’
testimony might place that witness, or a relative in a different
country, in danger. The danger of intimidation, injury, or even death
414
should not be taken lightly—grand jury tampering does occur.
Judicial supervision of any proposed disclosure is necessary to protect
grand jury witnesses from harm.
Judicial supervision may even further the goal of obtaining
helpful intelligence information from grand jury witnesses. If the
public begins to perceive grand juries as the tool of the intelligence
community, revealing anything and everything, witnesses may
withhold important information out of fear. Limiting disclosures to
materials involving truly vital information may actually help in the
acquisition of such information. It is indisputable that it might be
more convenient for the Justice Department to act unilaterally in
making the decision to disclose, but “‘doubtless all arbitrary powers,
415
well executed, are the most convenient.’”
“‘[Y]et let it be again
remembered that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of
This section amends Rule 6(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to make witnesses and persons to whom subpoenas are
directed subject to grand jury secrecy rules in cases where serious
adverse consequences may otherwise result, including danger to the
national security or to the life or physical safety of an individual, flight
from prosecution, destruction of or tampering with evidence,
intimidation of a potential witness, or other serious jeopardy to an
investigation. The provision would permit witnesses and recipients of
grand jury subpoenas to consult with counsel regarding the subpoena
and any testimony, but would impose the same secrecy obligations on
counsel.
Id.
413

See Bob Egelko, Bush, Kerry Divided on Scope of Patriot Act; President Says Expand,
Rival Says Reduce, S.F. CHRON., Sep. 20, 2004, at A1.
414
In the late 1970’s the General Accounting Office (GAO) documented “343
[grand jury] witnesses who had their identities revealed before any indictments were
returned by grand juries, including 5 who were murdered, 10 who were intimidated,
and 1 who disappeared.” GAO REP. TO CONG.: MORE GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION
NEEDED OVER FEDERAL GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS 6 (1980). Since the GAO studied
only a few of the federal districts, these numbers represent only “the tip of the
iceberg.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
415
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 545 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 350).
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justice are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in
416
Based on the foregoing, Congress was
more substantial matters.’”
correct in reviving the terrorism prevention exception, but erred in
failing to protect the secrecy that is essential to grand jury
proceedings.

416

Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 349, 350).
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IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 6(E)

417

As of January 18, 2005, Rule 6(e)(2), (3) read:
(e) Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings.
....
(2) Secrecy.
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person
except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B).
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons
must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury:
(i) a grand juror;
(ii) an interpreter;
(iii) a court reporter;
(iv) an operator of a recording device;
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;
(vi) an attorney for the government; or
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii);
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure of a grand-jury matter—other than the grand jury’s
deliberations or any grand juror’s vote—may be made to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in performing that
attorney’s duty;
(ii) any government personnel—including those of a state, state
subdivision, Indian tribe, or foreign government—that an attorney for
the government considers necessary to assist in performing that
attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law; or
(iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
(B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney for
the government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce federal
criminal law. An attorney for the government must promptly provide
the court that impaneled the grand jury with the names of all persons
to whom a disclosure has been made, and must certify that the attorney
has advised those persons of their obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury
matter to another federal grand jury.
(D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand-jury
matter involving foreign intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined
in 50 U.S.C. § 401a), or foreign intelligence information (as defined in
Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii)) to any federal law enforcement, intelligence,
protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official
to assist the official receiving the information in the performance of
that official’s duties. An attorney for the government may also disclose
any grand jury matter involving, within the United States or elsewhere,
a threat of attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or its
agent, a threat of domestic or international sabotage or terrorism, or
clandestine intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by its agent, to any appropriate
Federal, State, State subdivision, Indian tribal, or foreign government
official, for the purpose of preventing or responding to such threat or
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activities.
(i) Any official who receives information under Rule 6(e)(3)(D)
may use the information only as necessary in the conduct of that
person’s official duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized
disclosure of such information. Any State, State subdivision, Indian
tribal, or foreign government official who receives information under
Rule 6(e)(3)(D) may use the information only consistent with such
guidelines as the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence shall jointly issue.
(ii) Within a reasonable time after disclosure is made under
Rule 6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must file, under seal,
a notice with the court in the district where the grand jury convened
stating that such information was disclosed and the departments,
agencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.
(iii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(D), the term “foreign intelligence
information” means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United States
person, that relates to the ability of the United States to protect
against—
actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power
or its agent;
sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agent; or
clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United States
person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates
to—
the national defense or the security of the United States; or
the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
(E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a manner,
and subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a grand-jury
matter:
(i) preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
(ii) at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may
exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred
before the grand jury;
(iii) at the request of the government, when sought by a foreign
court or prosecutor for use in an official criminal investigation;
(iv) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter
may disclose a violation of State, Indian tribal, or foreign criminal law,
as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision,
Indian tribal, or foreign government official for the purpose of
enforcing that law; or
(v) at the request of the government if it shows that the matter
may disclose a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate
military official for the purpose of enforcing that law.
(F) A petition to disclose a grand-jury matter under Rule
6(e)(3)(E)(i) must be filed in the district where the grand jury
convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte—as it may be when the
government is the petitioner—the petitioner must serve the petition
on, and the court must afford a reasonable opportunity to appear and
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To address the concerns outlined above, I propose that Congress
418
amend Rule 6(e)(2), (3) to read:
(e) Recording and Disclosing the Proceedings.
....
(2) Secrecy.
(A) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person
except in accordance with Rule 6(e)(2)(B).
(B) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following
persons must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand
jury:
(i) a grand juror;
(ii) an interpreter;
(iii) a court reporter;

418

be heard to:
(i) an attorney for the government;
(ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and
(iii) any other person whom the court may designate.
(G) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial proceeding in
another district, the petitioned court must transfer the petition to the
other court unless the petitioned court can reasonably determine
whether disclosure is proper. If the petitioned court decides to
transfer, it must send to the transferee court the material sought to be
disclosed, if feasible, and a written evaluation of the need for
continued grand jury secrecy. The transferee court must afford those
persons identified in Rule 6(e)(3)(F) a reasonable opportunity to
appear and be heard.
(4) Sealed Indictment. The magistrate judge to whom an indictment is
returned may direct that the indictment be kept secret until the
defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial. The clerk
must then seal the indictment, and no person may disclose the
indictment’s existence except as necessary to issue or execute a warrant
or summons.
(5) Closed Hearing. Subject to any right to an open hearing in a
contempt proceeding, the court must close any hearing to the extent
necessary to prevent disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand
jury.
(6) Sealed Records. Records, orders, and subpoenas relating to grandjury proceedings must be kept under seal to the extent and as long as
necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring
before a grand jury.
(7) Contempt. A knowing violation of Rule 6, or of guidelines jointly
issued by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence pursuant to Rule 6, may be punished as a contempt of
court.
The substantive changes are underlined.
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(iv) an operator of a recording device;
(v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony;
(vi) an attorney for the government; or
(vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii);
(3) Exceptions.
(A) Disclosure of a grand jury matter—other than the
grand jury’s deliberations or any grand juror’s vote—may be
made to:
(i) an attorney for the government for use in performing
that attorney’s duty;
(ii) any government personnel—including those of a
state or state subdivision or of an Indian tribe—that an attorney
for the government considers necessary to assist in performing
that attorney’s duty to enforce federal criminal law; or
(iii) a person authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3322.
(B) A person to whom information is disclosed under Rule
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) may use that information only to assist an attorney
for the government in performing that attorney’s duty to enforce
federal criminal law. An attorney for the government must
promptly provide the court that impaneled the grand jury with
the names of all persons to whom a disclosure has been made,
and must certify that the attorney has advised those persons of
their obligation of secrecy under this rule.
(C) An attorney for the government may disclose any
grand-jury matter to another federal grand jury.
(D) An attorney for the government may disclose any grand
jury matter when the matter involves information that he or she
reasonably believes may evidence an imminent, substantial threat
to the United States homeland, its critical infrastructure, its key
resources (whether physical or electronic), or its persons or
interests worldwide, to any appropriate federal, state, local, or
foreign government official for the purpose of preventing or
responding to such a threat.
(i) Any official who receives information under Rule
6(e)(3)(D) may use that information only as necessary in the
conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations
on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
(ii) Any state, local, or foreign official who receives
information pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) shall use that
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information only consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney
General and Director of National Intelligence shall jointly issue.
(iii) After a disclosure made pursuant to Rule
6(e)(3)(D), an attorney for the government must promptly
provide the court with a notice containing the names of all
persons to whom a disclosure has been made, a brief description
of the information disclosed and the reason for the disclosure,
and a certification that the attorney has advised such persons of
any obligation of secrecy under this rule or any applicable
guidelines. This notice shall be filed under seal.
(E) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—of a
grand-jury matter preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding.
(F) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the
request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to
dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before
the grand jury.
(G) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the
request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose
a violation of state or Indian tribal criminal law, as long as the
disclosure is to an appropriate state, state-subdivision, or Indian
tribal official for the purpose of enforcing that law.
(H) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the
request of the government if it shows that the matter may disclose
a violation of military criminal law under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, as long as the disclosure is to an appropriate
military official for the purpose of enforcing that law.
(I) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the
request of the government if it shows that the matter involves
information that may evidence a substantial threat to the United
States homeland, its critical infrastructure, its key resources
(whether physical or electronic), or its persons or interests
worldwide, or it shows that such matters involve clandestine
intelligence gathering activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power,
within the United States or elsewhere, to any appropriate federal,
state, local, or foreign government official for the purpose of
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preventing or responding to such a threat or such activities.
(i) Any official who receives information under Rule
6(e)(3)(I) may use that information only as necessary in the
conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations
on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
(ii) In addition to any conditions imposed by the court,
any state, local, or foreign official who receives information
pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) may use that information only
consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney General and
Director of National Intelligence shall jointly issue.
(J) The court may authorize disclosure—at a time, in a
manner, and subject to any other conditions that it directs—at the
request of the government if it shows that such matters involve
significant foreign intelligence, counterintelligence (as defined in
50 U.S.C. § 401a), or foreign intelligence information (as defined
in Rule 6(e)(3)(J)(ii)) to any federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or
national security official to assist the official receiving the
information in the performance of that official’s duties.
(i) Any federal official who receives information under
Rule 6(e)(3)(J) may use the information only as necessary in the
conduct of that person’s official duties subject to any limitations
on the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
(ii) As used in Rule 6(e)(3)(J), the term “foreign
intelligence information” means:
(a) information, whether or not it concerns a United
States person, that relates to the ability of the United States to
protect against—
• actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts
of a foreign power or its agent;
• sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign
power or its agent; or
• clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence
service or network of a foreign power or by its agent; or
(b) information, whether or not it concerns a United
States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory
that relates to—
• the national defense or the security of the United
States; or
• the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States.
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(K) A petition to disclose a grand jury matter under Rule
6(e)(3)(E) must be filed in the district where the grand jury
convened. Unless the hearing is ex parte—as it may be when the
government is the petitioner—the petitioner must serve the
petition on, and the court must afford a reasonable opportunity
to appear and be heard to:
(i) an attorney for the government;
(ii) the parties to the judicial proceeding; and
(iii) any other person whom the court may designate.
(L) If the petition to disclose arises out of a judicial
proceeding in another district, the petitioned court must transfer
the petition to the other court unless the petitioned court can
reasonably determine whether disclosure is proper. If the
petitioned court decides to transfer, it must send to the transferee
court the material sought to be disclosed, if feasible, and a written
evaluation of the need for continued grand jury secrecy. The
transferee court must afford those persons identified in Rule
6(e)(3)(K) a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard.
(M) In Rule 6(e)(3)(D) and Rule 6(e)(3)(I),
(i) the term “substantial threat” means a threat of actual
or potential attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power, sabotage (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2152–2156), domestic or international terrorism (as defined in
18 U.S.C. § 2331), or use of weapons of mass destruction;
(ii) the term “information” as it relates to “a threat of
actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts by a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power” means all information
relating
to the existence, organization, capabilities,
communications, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of
finance or material support, or activities of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power relating to such threat, or to the same
information relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed
to be assisting or associated with them;
(iii) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of
“sabotage” means all information relating to the existence,
organization, capabilities, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means
of finance or material support, or activities of saboteurs or threats
posed by such groups or individuals to the United States, its
persons, or its interests or those of other associate nations (as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2151), or to communications between such
groups or individuals, or to the same information relating to
groups or individuals reasonably believed to be assisting or
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associated with them;
(iv) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of
“domestic or international terrorism” means all information
relating to the existence, organization, capabilities, plans,
intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material support,
or activities of foreign, international, or domestic terrorist groups
or individuals, or threats posed by such groups or individuals to
the United States, United States persons, or United States
interests, or those of other nations, or to communications
between such groups or individuals, or to the same information
relating to groups or individuals reasonably believed to be
assisting or associated with them;
(v) the term “information” as it relates to a threat of “use
of weapons of mass destruction” means all information relating to
conventional explosive weapons and non-conventional weapons
capable of causing mass casualties and damage, including
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and
weapons and the means of delivery of such weapons.
(N) A petition for disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or
Rule 6(e)(3)(J) shall be ruled upon by the judge designated in
subparagraph (O)(i) within forty-eight (48) hours of its filing.
Any review of a denial of such a petition shall be conducted as
expeditiously as possible.
(O) A notice of disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(D) or a
petition for disclosure pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(I) or Rule
6(e)(3)(J) shall be filed in the district where the grand jury
convened.
(i) The Chief Judge for each district shall designate one
judge serving within the district and one alternate to review such
notices and hear such petitions for a term of three years. If a
petition is denied, the court shall immediately provide for the
record a written statement of each reason for its decision. On
motion of the United States, the record shall be transmitted,
under seal, to the court of review established in Rule
6(e)(3)(O)(ii).
(ii) The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court shall publicly designate three judges, one of whom shall be
publicly designated as the presiding judge, from each United
States Court of Appeals who together shall comprise a court of
review which shall have jurisdiction to review the denial of any
petition within its Circuit under these subdivisions. If a court of
review determines that the application was properly denied, the
court shall immediately provide for the record a written statement
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of each reason for its decision and, on petition of the United
States for a writ of certiorari, the record shall be transmitted
under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to
review such decision.
(iii) The record of proceedings under Rule 6(e)(3)(O)
including notices filed, petitions made, and orders granted, shall
be maintained under security measures established by the Chief
Justice in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director
of Central Intelligence.

This amendment would preserve the best features of the Patriot
intelligence exception, the terrorism prevention exception, and the
information-sharing guidelines issued by the Attorney General. It
recognizes the need and right of prosecutors to share grand jury
materials relating to substantial threats to the United States and its
people. The pre-September 11th version of Rule 6(e) was lacking in
that it failed to provide for situations in which the need for secrecy is
outweighed by a need to protect against terrorism and other hostile
419
acts. Congress did not err in seeking to rectify this flaw. Congress
did err in completely excluding the courts from the decision-making
process and ignoring society’s interest in grand jury secrecy.
Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D) allows prosecutors to act unilaterally when
an imminent, substantial threat exists. The definitions in Rule
6(e)(3)(M) should help prosecutors identify the types of situations in
which this power should be invoked. Conversely, the reporting
requirement in proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(D)(iii) should guard against
prosecutorial abuse.
When no imminent threat exists, the proposed amendment
affords courts the opportunity to undertake the traditional,
constitutional balancing analysis to determine whether a
particularized need for disclosure exists and whether that need
420
outweighs society’s interest in maintaining grand jury secrecy.
Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(I) permits judicially-approved disclosure of
421
substantial threats to the nation’s security, and proposed Rule
6(e)(3)(J) permits judicially-approved disclosure of significant

419

The omission of an exception for the disclosure of intelligence information is
understandable.
Warfare has changed dramatically.
Until recently, it was
unimaginable that the United States would face terrorist attacks on the home front.
420
See supra Part II.E.
421
Proposed Rules 6(e)(3)(D) and 6(e)(3)(I) replace the terrorism prevention
exception.
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intelligence information.
Rule 6(e)(3)(O) provides for the appointment of a special judge
within each district and a special panel within each circuit to handle
notices and petitions filed pursuant to the new exceptions. Not only
does the appointment of this special court permit heightened
security, it also creates a corps of judges with special expertise in this
423
area. To facilitate an expedited response, Rule 6(e)(3)(N) requires
a decision within forty-eight hours of the filing of a petition. In short,
the proposed amendment would protect national security interests
without destroying the secrecy so crucial to grand jury functioning.
V. CONCLUSION
In creating the Patriot intelligence exception and the terrorism
prevention exception, Congress acted with the honorable intention
of avoiding further terrorist atrocities on American soil. But in the
words of Justice Brandeis:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
424
without understanding.

In its zeal to bolster our national security, Congress passed laws that
endanger our liberty. Both the Patriot intelligence exception and the
terrorism prevention exception violate the Grand Jury Clause of the
425
Fifth Amendment.
Constitutional questions aside, public policy
426
concerns caution against needlessly destroying grand jury secrecy.
By itself, doing away with grand jury secrecy would probably not bring
the Republic to its knees. But the destruction of this right must not
be viewed in isolation. With one stroke of the presidential pen,
Americans arguably lost a right older than the nation itself. In times
of national crisis, we must be even more vigilant in protecting the
basic rights on which our nation was built. By revisiting Rule 6(e),
Congress can draft a rule that strengthens national security while
preserving the grand jury system. The goals of liberty and security
422
423
424
425
426

Proposed Rule 6(e)(3)(J) replaces the Patriot intelligence exception.
Such judges should be provided with specialized training.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See supra Part III.A.1 & Part III.B.1.
See supra Part III.A.2 & Part III.B.2.
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should not be viewed as mutually exclusive.
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